Safety case content concordance table

Form

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Introduction

It is highly recommended that the operator include with, or as a part of, a safety case submission (or revised safety case submission) a concordance table clearly indicating each requirement of the Commonwealth Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety) Regulations (OPGGS(S) Regulations), 2.5 to 2.23 (i.e. the safety case contents requirements of Division 1, subdivisions A, B, C, & D) is addressed as these form an integral part of the acceptance criteria under OPGGS(S) Regulations 2.26 and 2.34. The additional content requirement for 5-year revisions (OPGGS(S) Regulation 2.32 (3)) has also been included for completeness. Note that different regulatory references may apply to facilities intended to be operated in State or Northern Territory designated coastal waters where powers have been conferred on NOPSEMA e.g. currently only the Victorian Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 2021 confer powers on NOPSEMA. However, these requirements closely mirror the Commonwealth regulatory requirements, so where applicable it is suggested that the equivalent Commonwealth requirements are considered below.

It is intended that operators could cut and paste the following table into their submission and populate the last three columns with references and page numbers of where in the safety case each requirement is primarily addressed. Use of such a table could serve both as a pre-submission check, and as regulation driven index to the safety case for any user of the safety case wishing to understand where in the safety case a particular requirement has been addressed.

This table should be used in conjunction with the NOPSEMA Guidance Note **N-04300-GN0106 Safety Case Content and Level of Detail** in particular, and other safety case guidance notes published by NOPSEMA and available on the NOPSEMA website’s [Safety Case Guidance Notes](http://www.nopsema.gov.au/safety/safety-case/safety-case-guidance-notes/) page.

This table presents an aggregated view of the OPGGS(S) Regulations 2.5 to 2.23 & 2.32 (3) that strives to ensure (where practical) that each row represents an actual content or level of detail requirement that must be addressed in a safety case. For clarity the italicised phase *[must provide evidence]* (or similar) has also been inserted into relevant line items to emphasise level of detail requirements. Where these phrases have been inserted minor editorial changes have been made to enhance readability.

This table may be of more practical use than a “raw” concordance table, although it should be noted this is not a definitive version of the regulations and operators should at all times remain mindful of the content of the regulations as written.

| Aggregated OPGGS(S) Regulations (Chapter 2) | | Primarily Addressed within: | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Reg | Requirement | FD | FSAD | SMSD |
| Part 2  Division 1  Subdiv A | Safety cases  Contents of safety cases  Contents of a safety case |  |  |  |
| 2.5(1) | Facility Description | | | |
| 2.5(1)(a) | The safety case for the facility must contain a description of the facility that gives details of the layout of the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(1)(b) | The safety case for the facility must contain a description of the facility that gives details of the technical and other control measures identified as a result of the formal safety assessment; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(1)(c) | The safety case for the facility must contain a description of the facility that gives details of the activities that will, or are likely to, take place at, or in connection with, the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(1)(d) | The safety case for the facility must contain a description of the facility that gives details of, for a facility that is a pipeline:   1. The route corridor of the pipeline and the pipeline’s interface start and end positions; and 2. The compositions of petroleum or greenhouse gas substance that are to be conveyed through the pipeline when it is operating; and 3. The safe operating limits for conveying those compositions through the pipeline; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(1)(e) | The safety case for the facility must contain a description of the facility that gives details of any other relevant matters. |  |  |  |
| 2.5(2) | Technical and other control measures that are critical to safety |  |  |  |
| 2.5(2) | The safety case for the facility must also identify which of the technical and other control measures mentioned in paragraph (1)(b) are critical to safety. |  |  |  |
| 2.5(3) | Formal Safety Assessment Description | | | |
| 2.5(3)(a) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the formal safety assessment for the facility, being an assessment, or series of assessments, conducted by the operator that *[provides evidence that the formal safety assessment]* identifies all hazards having the potential to cause a major accident event; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(3)(b) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the formal safety assessment for the facility, being an assessment, or series of assessments, conducted by the operator that *[provides evidence that the formal safety assessment]* is a detailed and systematic assessment of the risk associated with each of those hazards, including the likelihood and consequences of each potential major accident event; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(3)(c) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the formal safety assessment for the facility, being an assessment, or series of assessments, conducted by the operator that *[provides evidence that the formal safety assessment]* identifies the technical and other control measures that are necessary to reduce that risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.  *Note: A formal safety assessment relates only to major accident events.* |  |  |  |
| 2.5(3)(d) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the formal safety assessment for the facility, being an assessment, or series of assessments, conducted by the operator of the facility that describes the emergency response plan required to be followed in the event of an emergency in connection with the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4) | Safety Management System Description | | | |
| 2.5(4)(a) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* is comprehensive and integrated; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(b) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for all activities that will, or are likely to, take place at, or in connection with, the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(c) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for the continual and systematic identification of hazards to health and safety of persons at or near the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(d) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for the continual and systematic assessment of:   1. the likelihood of the occurrence, during normal or emergency situations, of injury or occupational illness associated with those hazards; and 2. the likely nature of such injury or occupational illness; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(e) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for the reduction to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable of risks to health and safety of persons at or near the facility including, but not limited to:   1. risks arising during evacuation, escape and rescue in case of emergency; and 2. risks arising from equipment and hardware; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(f) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for inspection, testing and maintenance of the equipment and hardware that are the physical control measures for those risks; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(g) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for adequate communications between the facility and any relevant:   1. facility; or 2. vessel; or 3. aircraft; or 4. on-shore installation; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(h) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* provides for any other matter that is necessary to ensure that the safety management system meets the requirements and objects of these Regulations; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(4)(i) | The safety case for the facility must also contain a detailed description of the safety management system that *[provides evidence that the safety management system]* specifies the performance standards that apply.  *Note: The safety management system must provide for all hazards and risks to persons at the facility, not just risks of major accident events.* |  |  |  |
| 2.5(5) | Safety case for construction or installation stage | | | |
| 2.5(5)(a) | If an operator of a facility submits to NOPSEMA a safety case for a construction or installation stage in the life of the facility, the safety case must contain the matters mentioned in subregulations (1) to (4) in relation to the facility at that stage in the life of the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(5)(b) | If an operator of a facility submits to NOPSEMA a safety case for a construction or installation stage in the life of the facility, the safety case must contain the matters mentioned in subregulations (1) to (4) in relation to the activities that will, or are likely to, take place at, or in connection with, the facility during that stage in the life of the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.5(5)(c) | If an operator of a facility submits to NOPSEMA a safety case for a construction or installation stage in the life of the facility, the safety case must contain the matters mentioned in subregulations (1) to (4) in relation to, to the extent that it is practicable — the facility and the activities that will, or are likely to, take place when the facility is in operation. |  |  |  |
| 2.5(6) | Requirements for safety case if facility is a new production facility or a new GHG facility |  |  |  |
| 2.5(6)(a) | If a design notification in relation to a facility was required to be submitted to NOPSEMA under Part 3, the safety case for the facility must include the design notification in relation to the facility that was provided to NOPSEMA in accordance with Part 3; |  |  |  |
| 2.5(6)(b) | If a design notification in relation to a facility was required to be submitted to NOPSEMA under Part 3, the safety case for the facility must include the details of the matters (if any) that NOPSEMA raised in its written comments on the design notification under Part 3; |  |  |  |
| 2.5(6)(c) | If a design notification in relation to a facility was required to be submitted to NOPSEMA under Part 3, the safety case for the facility must include a description of how those matters have been incorporated into the facility design, either by:   (i) describing how the facility design has been adapted in response to NOPSEMA’s comments; or   (ii) providing reasons why NOPSEMA’s comments have not been incorporated into the facility design. |  |  |  |
| 2.6 | Implementation and improvement of the Safety Management System | | | |
| 2.6(a) | The safety case for a facility must demonstrate that there are effective means of ensuring:  the implementation of the safety management system; and |  |  |  |
| 2.6(b) | The safety case for a facility must demonstrate that there are effective means of ensuring:  continual and systematic identification of deficiencies in the safety management system; and |  |  |  |
| 2.6(c) | The safety case for a facility must demonstrate that there are effective means of ensuring continual and systematic improvement of the safety management system. |  |  |  |
| Subdiv B | Safety Measures | | | |
| 2.7 | Standards to be applied | | | |
| 2.7 | The safety case for a facility must specify all Australian and international standards that have been applied, or will be applied, in relation to the facility or plant used on or in connection with the facility for the relevant stage or stages in the life of the facility for which the safety case is submitted. |  |  |  |
| 2.8 | Command Structure | | | |
| 2.8(1)(a) | The safety case for a facility must specify an office or position in relation to the facility, the occupant of which is in command of the facility and responsible for its safe operation when on duty; and |  |  |  |
| 2.8(1)(b) | The safety case for a facility must specify an office or position at the facility, the occupant of which is responsible for implementing and supervising procedures in the event of an emergency at the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.8(1)(c) | The safety case for a facility must specify the command structure that will apply in the event of an emergency at the facility.  *Note: The same person may occupy both of the offices or positions mentioned in (1)(a) and (1)(b).* |  |  |  |
| 2.8(2)(a) | The safety case must also describe, in detail, the means by which the operator will ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable the offices or positions mentioned in subregulation (1) are continuously occupied while the facility is in operation; and |  |  |  |
| 2.8(2)(b) | The safety case must also describe, in detail, the means by which the operator will ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable the person who occupies each office or position mentioned in subregulation (1) has the necessary skills, training and ability to perform the functions of the office or position; and |  |  |  |
| 2.8(2)(c) | The safety case must also describe, in detail, the means by which the operator will ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable that the identity of the following persons can, at all times, be readily ascertained by any person at the facility:  (i) persons who occupy each office or position mentioned in paragraphs 2.8(1)(a) and (b);  (ii) persons in the command structure mentioned in paragraph 2.8(1)(c). |  |  |  |
| 2.9 | Members of the workforce must be competent | | | |
| 2.9(a) | The safety case for a facility must describe the means by which the operator will ensure that each member of the workforce at the facility has the necessary skills, training and ability to undertake routine and non-routine tasks that might reasonably be given to him or her:   1. in normal operating conditions; and 2. in abnormal or emergency conditions; and 3. during any changes to the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.9(b) | The safety case for a facility must describe the means by which the operator will ensure that each member of the workforce at the facility has the necessary skills, training and ability to respond and react appropriately, and at the level that might be reasonably required of him or her, during an emergency. |  |  |  |
| 2.10 | Permit to work system for safe performance of various activities | | | |
| 2.10(1) | The safety case for a facility must provide for the operator of the facility to establish and maintain a documented system of coordinating and controlling the safe performance of all work activities of members of the workforce at the facility, including in particular:  (a) welding and other hot work; and  (b) cold work (including physical isolation); and  (c) electrical work (including electrical isolation); and  (d) entry into, and working in a confined space; and  (e) procedures for working over water; and  (f) diving operations.  *Note: Confined space is defined in regulation 1.5.* |  |  |  |
| 2.10(2)(a) | The *[permit to work system]* system must form part of the Safety Management System described in the safety case in force for the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.10(2)(b) | The *[description of the permit to work system must provide evidence that the]* system identifies the persons having responsibility to authorise and supervise work; and |  |  |  |
| 2.10(2)(c) | The *[description of the permit to work system must provide evidence that the]* system ensures that members of the workforce are competent in the application of the permit to work system. |  |  |  |
| 2.11 | Involvement of members of the workforce | | | |
| 2.11(1)(a) | The operator of a facility must demonstrate to NOPSEMA, to the reasonable satisfaction of NOPSEMA, that in the development or revision of the safety case for the facility, there has been effective consultation with, and participation of, members of the workforce; and |  |  |  |
| 2.11(1)(b) | The operator of a facility must demonstrate to NOPSEMA, to the reasonable satisfaction of NOPSEMA, that the safety case provides adequately for effective consultation with, and the effective participation of, the members of the workforce, so that they are able to arrive at informed opinions about the risks and hazards to which they may be exposed on the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.11(2) | A demonstration for the purposes of subregulation (1)(a) must be supported by adequate documentation.  *[Note: there is no specific requirement to include such documentation (with respect to 2.11 (1) (a)) as a part of the safety case but an operator could elect to do so.]* |  |  |  |
| 2.11(3)(a) | In subregulation (1):  *members of the workforce* includes members of the workforce who are identifiable before the safety case is developed; and |  |  |  |
| 2.11(3)(b) | In subregulation (1):  *members of the workforce* includes members of the workforce who are working, or likely to be working, on the relevant facility.  *Note: Part 3 of Schedule 3 of the Act sets out the broad consultative provisions that apply, including provisions for the establishment of designated workgroups, the election of health and safety representatives and the establishment of OHS committees.*  The arrangements under these consultative provisions should be used for consultation with members of the workforce about the development, preparation and revision of the safety case. |  |  |  |
| 2.12 | Design, construction, installation, maintenance and modification | | | |
| 2.12(1) | The safety case for a facility must describe the means by which the operator will ensure the adequacy of the design, construction, installation, maintenance or modification of the facility, for the relevant stage or stages in the life of the facility for which the safety case has been submitted. |  |  |  |
| 2.12(2)(a) | *[The description referred to in 2.12(1) must provide evidence that]*  In particular, the design, construction, installation, maintenance and modification of the facility must provide for adequate means of inventory isolation and pressure relief in the event of an emergency; and |  |  |  |
| 2.12(2)(b) | *[The description referred to in 2.12(1) must provide evidence that]*  In particular, the design, construction, installation, maintenance and modification of the facility must provide for adequate means of gaining access for servicing and maintenance of the facility and machinery and other equipment on board the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.12(2)(c) | *[The description referred to in 2.12(1) must provide evidence that]*  In particular, the design, construction, installation, maintenance and modification of the facility must provide for adequate means of maintaining the structural integrity of a facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.12(2)(d) | *[The description referred to in 2.12(1) must provide evidence that]*  In particular, the design, construction, installation, maintenance and modification of the facility must provide for implementation of the technical and other control measures identified as a result of the formal safety assessment. |  |  |  |
| 2.13 | Medical and pharmaceutical supplies and services | | | |
| 2.13 | The safety case in respect of a facility must specify the medical and pharmaceutical supplies and services, sufficient for an emergency situation that must be maintained on, or in respect of, the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.14 | Machinery and equipment | | | |
| 2.14(1) | The safety case in respect of a facility must specify the equipment required on the facility (including process equipment, machinery and electrical and instrumentation systems) that relates to, or may affect, the safety of the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.14(2)(a) | The safety case must demonstrate that the equipment is fit for its function or use in normal operating conditions; and |  |  |  |
| 2.14(2)(b) | The safety case must demonstrate that to the extent that the equipment is intended to function, or be used, in an emergency — the equipment is fit for its function or use in the emergency. |  |  |  |
| 2.15 | Drugs and intoxicants | | | |
| 2.15 | The safety case for a facility must describe the means by which the operator will ensure that there is in place, or will be put in place, a method of:   1. securing, supplying, and monitoring the use of, therapeutic drugs on the facility; and 2. preventing the use of controlled substances (other than therapeutic drugs) on the facility; and 3. preventing the use of intoxicants on the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.15A | Sexual harassment, bullying and harassment |  |  |  |
| 2.15A(a) | The safety case for a facility must describe the measures the operator of the facility has, or will, put in place to prevent sexual harassment, bullying and harassment at the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.15A(b) | The safety case for a facility must describe the measures the operator of the facility has, or will, put in place to comply with relevant legislation relating to sexual harassment, bullying and harassment; and |  |  |  |
| 2.15A(c) | The safety case for a facility must describe the measures the operator of the facility has, or will, put in place to report incidents of sexual harassment, bullying and harassment at the facility to NOPSEMA.  *Note: The Fair Work Act 2009 prohibits sexual harassment in connection with work. Other Commonwealth legislation (such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1984) and State and Territory legislation may also apply in particular cases.* |  |  |  |
| Subdiv C | Emergencies | | | |
| 2.16 | Evacuation, escape and rescue analysis | | | |
| 2.16(1) | The safety case for a facility must contain a detailed description of an evacuation, escape and rescue analysis. |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(a) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis identifies the types of emergency that could arise at the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(b) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis considers a range of routes for evacuation and escape of persons at the facility in the event of an emergency; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(c) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis considers alternative routes for evacuation and escape if a primary route is not freely passable; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(d) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis considers different possible procedures for managing evacuation, escape and rescue in the event of an emergency; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(e) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis considers a range of means of, and equipment for, evacuation, escape and rescue; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(f) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis considers a range of amenities and means of emergency communication to be provided in a temporary refuge; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(g) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis considers a range of life saving equipment, including:   1. life rafts to accommodate safely the maximum number of persons that are likely to be at the facility at any time; and 2. equipment to enable that number of persons to obtain access to the life rafts after launching and deployment; and 3. in the case of a floating facility — suitable equipment to provide a float-free capability and a means of launching; and |  |  |  |
| 2.16(2)(h) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.16(1) must provide evidence that]* the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis identifies, as a result of the considerations *[contained in 2.16(2)(b) to (g)]*, the technical and other control measures necessary to reduce the risks associated with emergencies to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.  *Note: In so far as it addresses major accident events, the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis forms part of the formal safety assessment.* |  |  |  |
| 2.17 | Fire and explosion risk analysis | | | |
| 2.17(1) | The safety case for a facility must contain a detailed description of a fire and explosion risk analysis. |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(a) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis identifies the types of fires and explosions that could occur at the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(b) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis considers a range of measures for detecting those fires and explosions in the event that they do occur; and |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(c) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis considers a range of measures for eliminating those potential fires and explosions, or for otherwise reducing the risk arising from fires and explosions; and |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(d) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis considers the incorporation into the facility of both automatic and manual systems for the detection, control and extinguishment of:   1. outbreaks of fire; and 2. leaks or escapes of petroleum; and |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(e) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis considers a range of means of isolating and safely storing hazardous substances, such as fuel, explosives and chemicals, that are used or stored at the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(f) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis considers the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis, in so far as it relates to fires and explosions; and |  |  |  |
| 2.17(2)(g) | *[The detailed description referred to in 2.17(1) must provide evidence that]* the fire and explosion risk analysis identifies, as a result of the considerations *[contained in 2.17(2)(b) to (f)]*, the technical and other control measures necessary to reduce the risks associated with fires and explosions to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.  *Note: In so far as it addresses major accident events, the fire and explosion risk analysis forms part of the formal safety assessment.* |  |  |  |
| 2.18 | Emergency communication systems | | | |
| 2.18(1) | The safety case for a facility must provide for communications systems that, in the event of an emergency in connection with the facility, are adequate for communication:   1. within the facility; and 2. between the facility and: 3. appropriate on-shore installations; and 4. appropriate vessels and aircraft; and 5. other appropriate facilities; |  |  |  |
| 2.18(2)(a) | In particular, the safety case must provide for the communications systems of the facility to be adequate to handle:   1. a likely emergency on or relating to the facility; and 2. the operation requirements of the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.18(2)(b) | In particular, the safety case must provide for the communications systems of the facility to be protected so as to be capable of operation in an emergency to the extent specified by the Formal Safety Assessment relating to the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.19 | Control systems | | | |
| 2.19 | The safety case for a facility must make adequate provision for the facility, in the event of an emergency, in respect of:   1. back-up power supply; and 2. lighting; and 3. alarm systems; and 4. ballast control; and 5. emergency shut-down systems. |  |  |  |
| 2.20 | Emergency preparedness | | | |
| 2.20(1)(a) | The safety case for a facility must describe a response plan designed to address possible emergencies, the risk of which has been identified in the formal safety assessment for the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.20(1)(b) | The safety case for a facility must provide for the implementation of that plan. |  |  |  |
| 2.20(2)(a) | *[The description referred to in 2.10(1)(a) above must provide evidence that]* the plan specifies all reasonably practicable steps to ensure the facility is safe and without risk to the health of persons likely to be on the facility at the time of the emergency; and |  |  |  |
| 2.20(2)(b) | *[The description referred to in 2.10(1)(a) above must provide evidence that]* the plan specifies the performance standards that it applies. |  |  |  |
| 2.20(3) | The safety case must make adequate provision for escape drill exercises and fire drill exercises by persons on the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.20(4) | *[The provisions made in the safety case must provide evidence that]* in particular, those exercises must ensure that those persons will be trained to function in the event of emergency with an adequate degree of knowledge, preparedness and confidence concerning the relevant emergency procedures. |  |  |  |
| 2.20(5) | The safety case must provide for the operator of the facility to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that escape drill exercises and fire drill exercises are held in accordance with the safety case relating to the facility. |  |  |  |
| 2.20(6)(a) | The safety case for a mobile facility must also specify systems that, in the event of an emergency, are adequate to shut down or disconnect, all operations on the facility that could adversely affect the health or safety at or near the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.20(6)(b) | The safety case for a mobile facility must also specify systems that are adequate to give appropriate audible and visible warnings of the shutting down or disconnecting of those operations. |  |  |  |
| 2.21 | Pipes | | | |
| 2.21(2) | The safety case for a facility that is:   1. connected to one or more pipes; or 2. proposed to be connected to one or more pipes;   that convey, or will convey, petroleum or greenhouse gas substance to the facility must describe arrangements and procedures for shutting down or isolating, in the event of emergency, each of those pipes, so as to stop the flow of petroleum or greenhouse gas substance into the facility through the pipe. |  |  |  |
| 2.21(3)(a) | *[The described arrangements and procedures referred to in 2.21(2) must provide evidence that]* in particular, the arrangements and procedures must include effective means of controlling and operating all relevant emergency shut-down valves for a pipe; and |  |  |  |
| 2.21(3)(b) | *The described arrangements and procedures referred to in 2.21(2) must provide evidence that]* in particular, the arrangements and procedures must include a fail-safe system of isolating a pipeline in the event of failure of other safety devices for the pipe. |  |  |  |
| 2.21(4)(a) | The safety case in respect of a facility must also specify adequate means of mitigating, in the event of emergency, the risks associated with each pipe connected to the facility; and |  |  |  |
| 2.21(4)(b) | The safety case in respect of a facility must also specify a frequency of periodic inspection and testing of pipe emergency shut-down valves that can reasonably be expected to ensure that they will operate correctly in an emergency. |  |  |  |
| 2.22 | Vessel and aircraft control | | | |
| 2.22(1) | The safety case for a facility must describe a system, that is implemented or will be implemented, as part of the operation of the facility that ensures, as far as reasonably practicable, the safe performance of operations that involve vessels or aircraft. |  |  |  |
| 2.22(2) | *[The description referred to in 2.22(1) must provide evidence that]* the system will be able to meet the emergency response requirements identified in the Formal Safety Assessment in relation to the facility and be described in the facility’s Safety Management System. |  |  |  |
| 2.22(3) | *[The description referred to in 2.22(1) must provide evidence that]* the equipment and procedures for ensuring safe vessel and aircraft operations are fit for purpose. |  |  |  |
| Subdiv D | Record keeping | | | |
| 2.23 | Arrangements for records | | | |
| 2.23(2)(a) | The safety case for a facility must include arrangements for making a record of the documents; and |  |  |  |
| 2.23(2)(b) | The safety case for a facility must include arrangements for securely storing the documents and records:   1. at an address nominated for the facility; and 2. in a manner that facilitates their retrieval as soon as practicable. |  |  |  |
| Division 3 | Revised safety cases | | | |
| 2.32 | Revision after 5 years | | | |
| 2.32(3) | A revised safety case submitted under this regulation must describe the means by which the operator will ensure the ongoing integrity of the technical and other measures identified by the formal safety assessment for the facility. |  |  |  |