

Notifiable incident

Notification ID	NTF11902
Duty holder	Woodside Energy Ltd
Facility/Activity	CWLH OKHA FPSO
Nearest state	WA
Incident	OHS-DSCE-Sensors not meeting performance standard

Basic information provided at time of notification	
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	30/11/2022 12:00 PM (AWST)
Notification date	30/11/2022 07:54 PM (AWST)
NOPSEMA response date	30/11/2022 08:30 PM (AWST)
Received by	[REDACTED]

Summary of information provided	
Brief descriptive title	OHS-DSCE-Sensors not meeting performance standard
Incident location	
Subtype/s	Other
Summary <i>(provided at notification)</i>	Operator reported a dangerous occurrence. A detailed audit revealed that there was a delay in sensor response that could impact the performance standard in that these would be delayed in achieving the overall prescribed process safety time requirements. Investigation into fully understand the impacts has commenced and an operational risk assessment has been conducted. Return call went unanswered the actual time was unknown and the time entered was a nominal value

Request permission to disturb the site	
Permission given	Not Applicable
Permission given by	
Permission given on	

Initial spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	
Liquid (L)	
Release type	
More information	

Details of person providing information to NOPSEMA	
Full name	[REDACTED]
Job title	[REDACTED]

Initial notification category	
Initial category type <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category <i>(based on notification)</i>	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Running sheet

There are no running sheet entries for this notification

Decision

Escalate to level 1	Yes
Inspector	[REDACTED]
Escalated on	01/12/2022 10:05

Final notification category

Final category type <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category <i>(based on final report)</i>	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Immediate causes

Details	To be determined as part Internal investigation in accordance with the Woodside "Health, Safety and Environment Event Reporting, Investigating and Learning Procedure"
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Initial report

Due date	03/12/2022
Received date	03/12/2022
Reviewed date	06/12/2022
Reviewed by	[REDACTED]

<p>Additional details provided by duty holder</p>	<p>Brief description of incident: It has been identified that multiple level transmitters had high internal damping settings. This has the potential to affect the ability for individual Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) to meet their required Process Safety Time (PST) as per Performance Standard requirements F06.1 & F06.5. An instrument response time of 0.4 seconds is assumed in Okha Maximum Allowable Response Time (MART) calculations for final elements, whereas actual instrument response time would be higher than this with damping in place.</p> <p>Work or activity being undertaken at time of incident 5 yearly Okha Functional Safety Assessment (FSA) site visit by external party</p> <p>What are the Internal Investigation Arrangements Internal investigation in accordance with the Woodside "Health, Safety and Environment Event Reporting, Investigating and Learning Procedure"</p> <p>Action taken to make the work-site safe: Action taken Engineering support engaged and an Operational Risk Assessment completed to assess the overall risk to the facility and required controls. Detailed risk assessment confirmed that all H&S SIFs were still effective, based on PSTs being >30 seconds, revised PST calculations and/or actual final element response times. Details of any disturbance of the work site See Immediate Actions Taken</p> <p>Was an emergency response initiated? No Was anyone killed or injured? No</p> <p>Immediate action taken/intended, if any, to prevent recurrence of incident. Action All H&S SIF transmitters with PSTs of <30 seconds have had their damping setting checked and reduced where required to ensure maximum damping setting of 5 seconds for Level, 1 second for Temperature and 0.4 seconds for Pressure. Responsible party [REDACTED] Completion date 03-Dec-2022 Actual or Intended Actual</p> <p>Action Review remaining individual transmitters for correct damping setting, implement changes to instruments as instructed by Onshore Engineering support. Responsible party [REDACTED] Completion date 12-Dec-2022 Actual or Intended Intended</p>
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Final report	
Due date	30/12/2022
Received date	20/12/2022
Reviewed date	12/01/2023
Reviewed by	[REDACTED]

Additional details provided by duty holder	<p>Full Report:</p> <p>Describe investigation in detail, including who conducted the investigation and in accordance with what standard/procedure The investigation was carried out in accordance with Woodside HSE Event Reporting Investigating and Learning Procedure. During 5Y Functional Safety Assessment the audit team identified damping discrepancy between in field instrument damping and what was calculated as part of overall Process Safety Time (PST) for Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), that impacts SIF response time. The Woodside Independent Protection Layers Guideline specifies level transmitters of this type to have damping set to 0.4sec. Immediate action was all H&S SIF transmitters with a process safety time of <30 seconds have had their damping setting checked and reduced where required to ensure maximum damping setting of 5 seconds for level transmitters, 1 second for temperature transmitters and 0.4 seconds for pressure transmitters. This has been captured in the Woodside Management of Change system.</p> <p>Actions to prevent recurrence of same or similar incident</p> <p>Action Engineering to Review Functional Safety Audit findings and update agreed documentation Responsible party [REDACTED] Completion date 30-Sep-2023 Actual or Intended Intended</p> <p>Action Identify location for updated OKHA damping settings and update. Location to be communicated to all disciplines involved in transmitter maintenance. Responsible party [REDACTED] Completion date 31-Mar-2023 Actual or Intended Intended</p> <p>Action Inspect and change transmitter internal damping settings as instructed by In [REDACTED] Responsible party [REDACTED] Completion date 12-Dec-2022 Actual or Intended Actual</p> <p>Action Communicate revisions to the documentation as outlined in items 1-3 above to the business. Responsible party [REDACTED] Completion date 13-Dec-2022 Actual or Intended Actual</p>
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Final spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	0.00
Liquid (L)	0.00
Release type	
More information	

Root causes	
Code	

Description	Has the investigation been completed? Yes Root cause analysis Root Causes Analysis Factor: HP3-2 Management System - SPAC Not Used Comments Deviation from Basis of Design (BOD) during commissioning (increased damping settings not assessed and/or recorded) which has led to incorrect figures being used for PST calculations.
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All data received	
Date	12/01/2023