INTERNAL USE ONLY

Notifiable incident

Notification ID NTF11858

Duty holder Woodside Energy Global Pty Ltd

Facility/Activity Pyrenees
Nearest state WA

Incident OHS-DCSE - number 2 boiler LP fuel gas line was below the minimal allowable wall thickness.

Basic information provided at time of notification	
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	13/11/2022 02:19 PM (AWST)
Notification date	13/11/2022 02:19 PM (AWST)
NOPSEMA response date	(AWST)
Received by	

Summary of information provided	
Brief descriptive title	OHS-DCSE - number 2 boiler LP fuel gas line was below the minimal allowable wall thickness.
Incident location	
Subtype/s	
Summary (provided at notification)	failure to meet a performance standard during ongoing fabric maintenance and piping inspections. It has been determined that four points on the number 2 boiler LP fuel gas line was below the minimal allowable wall thickness. Inspection was conducted on the 7th November at 8:00 AM. The fuel gas system to #2 boiler was immediately isolated so their inspections continued to identified any further defects.

Request permission to disturb the site	
Permission given	Not Applicable
Permission given by	
Permission given on	

Initial spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	
Liquid (L)	
Release type	
More information	

Details of person providing information to NOPSEMA	
Full name	
Job title	

Initial notification category	
Initial category type (based on notification)	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category (based on notification)	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Decision	
Escalate to level 1	Yes
Inspector	
Escalated on	15/11/2022 07:33

Final notification category	
Final category type (based on final report)	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category (based on final report)	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Immediate causes	
Details	What were the immediate causes of the incident? - External corrosion to piping

Initial report	
Due date	16/11/2022
Received date	17/11/2022
Reviewed date	22/11/2022
Reviewed by	
Additional details provided by duty holder	Brief description of incident - Pyrenees Boiler Fuel Gas Line 125-FG-550 & 125-FG-551 Low Wall Thickness *Note: 125-FG-550 line was de-pressurised and had been placed under a long-term isolation as a result of the fuel gas skid reportable event Work or activity being undertaken at time of incident - Planned fabric maintenance activities were being completed on lines 125- FG-550 (line is de-pressurised and had been placed under a long-term isolation as a result of the fuel gas skid reportable event) and on line 125-FG-551 What are the internal investigation arrangements? - Non-destructive testing of spools and repairs method endorsed by Was there any loss of containment of any fluid (liquid or gas)? - No Was NOPSEMA notified through the dedicated notification phone line? - Yes Action taken to make the work-site safe - 125-FG-550 line already de-pressurised and placed under a long-term isolation. 125-FG-551 has subsequently been isolated and depressurised. Was an emergency response initiated? - No Was an emergency response initiated? - No Was there any serious damage? - No Will the equipment be shut down? - Yes If yes, for how long? - Until effective repair is conducted Will the facility be shut down? - No Immediate action taken/intended, if any, to prevent recurrence of incident: Action 1 - Isolate fuel gas line 125-FG-551 to boiler Responsible party - Completion date - 7/11/2022 Action 2 - Fit For Service assessment to be performed on fuel gas lines and agreed by Responsible Party - Completion Date - 30-11-2022

Due date	13/12/2022
Received date	15/12/2022
Reviewed date	19/12/2022
Reviewed by	
Additional details provided by duty holder	Full report During completion of Fabric Maintenance on No 1 Boiler Fuel Gas Supply on 06/11/22 an inspection was conducted on the parallel line 125-FG-551 (No. 2 Boiler Fuel Gas Supply) which identified a similar condition to No 1. The decision was made to isolate the line and complete a detailed inspection and assessment. The inspection started on the 08/11/22 which identified pipework close to minimum allowable wall thickness under the pipe support, initiating this event. History In August 2022, during the investigation into an event relating to low wall thickness on the Fuel Gas Skid, the lidentified that the Fuel Gas Pipework had begun to externally corrode. Review of the work order history and the condition of the pipework identified that the new coating had not been applied with adequate freshwater wash down prior to coat application. Notifications were raised to complete inspection of the Fuel Gas Lines. The nominated to utilize Profile Radiography to confirm the remaining wall at pipe supports. This did not indicate there were any thin@walled locations at the time of inspection. Actions to prevent recurrence of same or similar incident Action - MOC Defined Life Repair to 125-FG-550/551 - Responsible Party - Completion Date - 31.03.2023 Action - Identify Method for CUPS Inspection Responsible Party - Completion Date - 31.03.2023 Action - Main Deck GVI Strategy - Responsible Party - Completion Date - 27.01-2023

Final spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	0.00
Liquid (L)	0.00
Release type	
More information	

Root causes				
Code				
Description	Has the investigation been completed? Yes			
	Root cause analysis Root cause 1 There is no General Visual Inspection Routine for the Main Deck. Root cause 2 Work completed by Core Crew without			
	adequate oversight of application method. Root cause 3 Method for the inspection of Corrosion at Pipe Support has not been developed. Other root causes No requirement for shims was specified for the Engine Room Pipework.			

All data received					
Date	19/12/2022				