Please check the following boxes if applicable to this report		Nil Incident Report: ☐		Final report for this activity: ☐	
Titleholder name:	**Woodside Energy Ltd**	**Titleholder business address:**	**Mia Yellagonga, 11 Mount St Perth WA 6000**	**Title of environment plan for the activity:**	**Okha FPSO Facility Operations Environment Plan [Rev 7]**
Activity type: (e.g. drilling, seismic, production)	**Production**	**Month, Year:**	**April, 2025**	**Facility name and type:** (e.g. MODU, Seismic Vessel, FPSO)	**Okha FPSO**
Contact person:	[redacted]	**Email:**	[redacted]**@woodside.com**	**Phone:**	[redacted]
Incident date	**All material facts and circumstances** (including release volumes to environment if applicable)	**Performance outcome(s) and/or standard(s) breached**	**Action taken to avoid or mitigate any adverse environmental impacts of the incident**	**Corrective action taken, or proposed, to stop, control or remedy this incident**	**Action taken, or proposed, to prevent a similar incident occurring in future**
13-Apr-25	During inspection of WA06 subsea well gas bubbles was seen emanating from the vent port at the base of the Annulus Master Valve (AMV).	Yes, 6.8.3. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Loss of Well Containment (MEE-01) PS 12.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • P10 – Wells to: – ensure that a well retains the mechanical integrity to contain reservoir fluids within the well envelope at all times to avoid a MEE. Including operate phase environmentally critical equipment for pressure containment, structures, monitoring and isolating systems associated with the well.	Operational risk Assessment (ORA) conducted and was assessed safe to continue operating WA6 based on the location of the well from the FPSO, the weep rate and the low likelihood of weep escalation (based on previous experiences).	ORA confirmed the following controls to manage risk to acceptable level and prevent potential for escalation of MEE-01: - The W3G pressure gauge is available to detect MEE-02. - The AMV and Annulus Wing Valve (AWV) passed API criteria during the 2024 leak off test and function test. No impact to wells ability to isolate reservoir to prevent MEE-02. - Existing annual WA6 Christmas Tree inspection to monitor and report weep conditions. - Hydraulic system is available and functional to provide reservoir isolation if required.	Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) inspection frequency increased from 4Y to 1Y. An Operations Instruction to be put in place to close the Production Master Valve (PMV) whenever the Production Wing Valve (PWV) is required to be closed to minimize the gas weep.

12-Apr-25	During 6-monthly Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) Beacon testing, 6 beacons were found not to be operating.	Yes, 6.8.5. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Topsides Loss of Containment (MEE-03) PS 12.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: E04 – Safety Critical Communications to: − allow effective Emergency Response (ER) communications in emergencies, including: o internal communications such as audible and visual warning systems and voice communications during emergency events o external communications such as voice communications to adjacent facilities, aircraft and vessels, and external incident control centres during emergency events.	No environmental impact, hazard only.	Replacement Beacons to be installed. Replacement of Priority Beacons for MOD 3 and Engine room arrived onboard 17/04/25. The remaining Beacons will be replaced when materials become available.	The investigation of the faulty equipment identified that the beacons have been in operation for 10+ years. No obvious defects or impact damage noted that could have resulted in the failure. Investigation conclusion: components have reached end of service life. No further action.

12-Apr-25	During routine maintenance 5-yearly deluge testing, a foam deluge valve failed to fully open on initiation from CCR.	Yes, 6.8.8. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Loss of Structural Integrity (MEE-06) PS 17.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • F14 – Firewater System • F15 – Manual Fire Fighting Equipment • F16 – Foam Systems • F17 – Fire Water Pump • F18 – Fire Main • F19 – Fire Suppression Systems; to together: − provide reliable and secure delivery of firefighting medium (e.g. firewater, gaseous suppressant, foam) at the required flows, pressures, coverage and discharge rates to reduce the likelihood of escalation − where safe to do so, enable facility emergency response personnel to apply fire fighting medium to support fire control and limit escalation. • F20 – Passive Fire and Explosion Protection to: − mitigate the effects of a fire or explosion by maintaining the integrity of critical structure and equipment and limiting the potential for escalation. • F27 – Control of Ignition Sources to:	No environmental impact, hazard only.	The valve was cycled several times and subsequently tested without issue.	Review of the maintenance frequency and effectiveness of the foam deluge automatic valves.

		– prevent ignition of flammable or explosive atmospheres within identified			
10-Apr-25	A shut down valve (SDV) failed to meet its specified Maximum Allowable Response Time (MART). Stroking of the valve resulted in closure times ranging from 32 to 37 seconds. The valve's MART is 30 seconds based on Cat 1 Riser and Pipeline Emergency Shutdown.	Yes, 6.8.5. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Topsides Loss of Containment (MEE-03) PS 14.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • F06 – Safety Instrumented System to: – detect and respond to pre-defined initiating conditions to protect mechanical integrity and prevent loss of containment (including uncontrolled diesel transfer/overflow) • F21 – Relief Systems to: – protect pressurised equipment, equipment exposed to high pressures and piping from a loss of containment to prevent escalation to a MEE.	No environmental impact, hazard only.	The valve was inspected externally, hydraulics flow paths confirmed correct. No external issues identified. Internal of valve, actuator or hydraulic piping degradation could not be ruled out as a contributing factor.	Engineering to review and determine whether to overhaul valve or increase MART for valve 04SDV020054 based on known history.

3-Apr-25	Foam concentrate found compromised in the forward foam system tank due to seawater contamination. A foam sample analysis was completed and found unsatisfactory.	Yes, 6.8.8. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Loss of Structural Integrity (MEE-06) PS 17.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • F14 – Firewater System • F15 – Manual Fire Fighting Equipment • F16 – Foam Systems • F17 – Fire Water Pump • F18 – Fire Main • F19 – Fire Suppression Systems; to together: − provide reliable and secure delivery of firefighting medium (e.g. firewater, gaseous suppressant, foam) at the required flows, pressures, coverage and discharge rates to reduce the likelihood of escalation − where safe to do so, enable facility emergency response personnel to apply fire fighting medium to support fire control and limit escalation. • F20 – Passive Fire and Explosion Protection to: − mitigate the effects of a fire or explosion by maintaining the integrity of critical structure and equipment and limiting the potential for escalation. • F27 – Control of Ignition Sources to:	No environmental impact, hazard only.	Develop a plan to conduct maintenance on the suspected passing valves and replace as required. Note: Vessel has an aft foam system that gives 100% coverage in the event of an emergency.	Proposed actions: - Update the inspection procedure to include an overall visual inspection of the fwd and aft foam system. - Overhaul proportioner and Process Control Valve.

		– prevent ignition of flammable or explosive atmospheres within identified			
5-Apr-25	Review and re-assessment of risk due to Okha WA6 Annulus Pressure (AP) gauge currently being out of service (OOS). A non-functioning AP gauge constitutes a non-compliance to Performance Standard P10 Wells."	Yes, 6.8.3. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Loss of Well Containment (MEE-01) PS 12.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • P10 – Wells to: – ensure that a well retains the mechanical integrity to contain reservoir fluids within the well envelope at all times to avoid a MEE. Including operate phase environmentally critical equipment for pressure containment, structures, monitoring and isolating systems associated with the well.	No environmental impact, hazard only.	An MOC was developed to capture WA6 AP gauge being OOS and why it is acceptable to continue to produce WA6.	No actions identified. This MOC captures the WA6 AP gauge being OOS and why it is acceptable to continue to produce WA6. The risk of over-pressurising the A-Annulus is remote as the WA6 Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure (MAASP) (25,500 kPa) is above the gas lift discharge pressure. The gas lift system will trip on a HH pressure alarm at 19,000 kPa (04PZI043030) thus, the WA6 A-Annulus should not see pressure exceeding 19,000 kPa.

16-Apr-25	Multiple Anodes Depletion and reported low Cathodic Protection (CP) of the Subsea Flowlines & Systems	Yes, 6.8.4. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Subsea Equipment Loss of Containment (MEE-02) PS 13.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • P09 – Pipeline Systems • P23 – Mooring Systems • F06 – Safety Instrumented System to together: • maintain the minimum required mechanical and structural integrity to prevent loss of containment that may result in a MEE • detect and respond to predefined initiating conditions to protect mechanical integrity.	No environmental impact, hazard only.	No immediate integrity threat identified. CP study to follow.	A CP study is required for the overall system health due to age of asset, ensure system is functional until End of Field Life (EOFL). Subject to study results, remediation for installation of anode skid/CP bonding wire may be required.

Approved by: [redacted]

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