

Notifiable incident

Notification ID [NTF11824](#)

Duty holder Woodside Energy Global Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity Pyrenees
Nearest state WA
Incident OHS-DSCE - 24 volt cable to valve damaged by davit crane

Basic information provided at time of notification

Notification type	Incident
Incident date	19/10/2022 12:00 PM (AWST)
Notification date	24/10/2022 02:28 PM (AWST)
NOPSEMA response date	24/10/2022 03:30 PM (AWST)
Received by	[REDACTED]

Summary of information provided

Brief descriptive title	OHS-DSCE - 24 volt cable to valve damaged by davit crane
Incident location	
Subtype/s	Electrical
Summary <i>(provided at notification)</i>	A manual pedestal davit crane (360 degree slew) damaged a 24V cable which was linked to a limit switch of a valve. The davit crane that is held in position with a pin was positioned on the inboard side of the facility intersected with the geostationary section of turret. Further investigation found an alarm raised 19 October. 24 volt power has been isolated and davit arm related. Cable is being repaired and arrows will be set on davit to guide operators to store davit in a seaward position in future.

Request permission to disturb the site

Permission given	Not Applicable
Permission given by	
Permission given on	

Initial spill and release amounts

Gas (kg)	
Liquid (L)	
Release type	
More information	

Details of person providing information to NOPSEMA

Full name	[REDACTED]
Job title	[REDACTED]

Initial notification category

Initial category type <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category <i>(based on notification)</i>	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Running sheet

There are no running sheet entries for this notification

Decision

Escalate to level 1	Yes
Inspector	
Escalated on	25/10/2022 10:34

Final notification category

Final category type <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category <i>(based on final report)</i>	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Immediate causes

Details	Lack of understanding of the turret interface between the separate weathervaning FPSO hull section and the geostationary turret section
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Initial report

Due date	22/10/2022
Received date	24/10/2022
Reviewed date	27/10/2022
Reviewed by	

Additional details provided by duty holder	<p>Brief description of incident: At 1030 hours on Mon 24th October 2022, electricians discovered damage to the position indicator (travel limit) wiring associated with Ravensworth Gaslift SDV-7011-01. The wiring circuit is a 24 volt system and is rated EXD (flameproof). Upon further investigation it was identified that the Lower Turret Davit (Y-2671) arm had impacted the wiring. The Lower Turret Davit is located on the FPSO main deck adjacent to the lower turret access ladder. The wiring that was impacted is located on the overhead geostationary turret section. The Lower Turret Davit arm is designed to be slewed 360 degrees. It can be restrained in a number of positions by using a nut and bolt as a pin to prevent uncontrolled slewing. The Lower Turret Davit arm had been left parked in a position where it could impact the overhead geostationary turret section.</p> <p>Work or activity being undertaken at time of incident Normal operations – Maintenance - fault finding of Ravensworth Gaslift SDV-7011-01 position indicator</p> <p>What are the internal investigation arrangements? Five Whys by facility personnel</p> <p>Action taken to make the work-site safe Action taken: Power isolated to the relevant 24 Volt circuit. Relocation of the Lower Turret Davit arm to a position where it could not impact the overhead geostationary turret section</p> <p>Was an emergency response initiated? No Was anyone killed or injured? No</p> <p>Immediate action taken/intended, if any, to prevent recurrence of incident.</p> <p>Action - Power isolated to the relevant 24 Volt circuit. - Responsible party - [REDACTED] - Completion date - Completed 24/10/22.</p> <p>Action - Relocation of the Lower Turret Davit arm to a position where it could not impact the overhead geostationary turret section - Responsible party - [REDACTED] - Completion date - Completed 24/10/22.</p> <p>Action - Repair the damaged wiring - Responsible party - [REDACTED] - Completion date - Completed 24/10/22.</p> <p>Action - Mark the Lower Turret Davit arm clearly identifying the position that the Lower Turret Davit arm is to be parked when not in use, or unattended - Responsible Party - [REDACTED] - Completion Date - 27/10/2022</p>
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Final report	
Due date	18/11/2022
Received date	29/11/2022
Reviewed date	29/11/2022
Reviewed by	[REDACTED]

Additional details provided by duty holder	<p>The Rev 0 final report was incomplete. An updated version of the final report (correctly filled out was requested) - see email in A893774. The revision 1 final report was provided on 29/11/2022 (see A894947) which contained the following information:</p> <p>Root cause 1 - Lack of understanding of the turret interface between the separate weathervaning FPSO hull section and the geostationary turret section</p> <p>Investigation undertaken by facility personnel [REDACTED] and onshore engineering personnel [REDACTED]</p> <p>Assessment of Ignition Potential conducted by [REDACTED] - The area classification of the incident is Zone 2. The definition of Zone 2 as per IEC 60079 is: an explosive atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operations, but if it does occur it will exist for a short period only. The cable that was severed was a 24Vdc extra low voltage cable (1.5mm² control cable). The conductor appeared to be cleanly sheared.</p> <p>The likelihood of a potential ignition source is extremely low to nil. Taking into considerations: the area classification is Zone 2, open space (not an enclosed environment) and potential energy level (extra low voltage).</p> <p>In terms of electrical safety, the risk is zero as the voltage level is extra low voltage.</p> <p>The engineering team have assessed the suitability of a new boom that can be raised/lowered after use however concluded that the risk remains if the davit is not stowed correctly i.e. failure to lower the boom. The only other control that would eliminate the risk would be to remove the davit following use, however this would provide unintended consequences to personnel when manual handling the davit (~40kg).</p> <p>Actions to prevent recurrence of same or similar incident:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mark the Lower Turret Davit arm clearly identifying the position that the Lower Turret Davit arm is to be parked when not in use, or unattended - Raise awareness and understanding of the turret interface between the separate weathervaning FPSO hull section and the geostationary turret section. To be achieved by discussing the incident as part of the Facility Induction process and Facility HSE meetings.
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Final spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	0.00
Liquid (L)	0.00
Release type	
More information	

Root causes	
Code	
Description	<p>Root cause analysis</p> <p>Has the investigation been completed? Yes</p> <p>Root cause 1</p> <p>Lack of understanding of the turret interface between the separate weathervaning FPSO hull section and the geostationary turret section</p>

All data received	
Date	29/11/2022

