Please check the following boxes if applicable to this report	Nil Incident Report: ☐		Final report for this activity: ☐		
Titleholder name:	**Woodside Energy Ltd**	**Titleholder business address:**	**Mia Yellagonga, 11 Mount St Perth WA 6000**	**Title of environment plan for the activity:**	**Okha FPSO Facility Operations Environment Plan (Rev 7) [EH0005AH0004]**
Activity type: (e.g. drilling, seismic, production)	**Production**	**Month, Year:**	**March, 2025**	**Facility name and type:** (e.g. MODU, Seismic Vessel, FPSO)	**Okha FPSO**
Contact person:	[redacted]	**Email:**	[redacted]**@woodside.com**	**Phone:**	[redacted]

Incident date	All material facts and circumstances (including release volumes to environment if applicable)	Performance outcome(s) and/or standard(s) breached	Action taken to avoid or mitigate any adverse environmental impacts of the incident	Corrective action taken, or proposed, to stop, control or remedy this incident	Action taken, or proposed, to prevent a similar incident occurring in future
18-Mar-25	A fault caused by moisture in a Manual Alarm Call point (MAC) set off general alarm	Yes, 6.8.5. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Topsides Loss of Containment (MEE-03) PS 13.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • F01 – Fire and Gas Detection and Alarm System; to continuously monitor and alert for fire events and significant gas accumulations, initiate actions to minimise event escalation, and support Emergency Response by providing status of situation.	None, no impact to environment	Post General Alarm, fault finding was initiated. The riser MAC points were inhibited via a Safety System Isolation Certificate (SSIC), and restrictions were put in place as per the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) to control and restrict access to the riser. The MAC points on the riser (5 of) were internally inspected, function tested, and insulation resistance testing completed on each point. Subsequent testing of cabling / plugs, terminations and junction boxes yielded no fault. The testing was then extended to the electrical swivel and the earth fault	Replace MAC point socket to spare cable and reinstate full functionality to Manual Call point on Riser

				presented when insulation resistance testing was undertaken. This fault could not be resolved so an alternative cable in the swivel was identified to be utilised to reinstate full functionality of the swivel MAC points.	
10-Mar-25	Shutdown valve failed to meet specified Maximum Allowable Response Time	Yes, 6.8.5. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Topsides Loss of Containment (MEE-03) PS 14.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • F06 – Safety Instrumented System to: – detect and respond to pre-defined initiating conditions to protect mechanical integrity and prevent loss of containment (including uncontrolled diesel transfer/overflow) • F21 – Relief Systems to: – protect pressurised equipment, equipment exposed to high pressures and piping from a loss of containment to prevent escalation to a MEE.	No impact to environment. Valve was confirmed to be in closed position during shut down	Cycled the valve multiple times with no repeat of the slow operation and the positioner was also investigated with no issues. The regulated air supply was increased slightly within the allowable range. The first test of close actuation saw the valve complete its stroke in 3 seconds. This test was conducted multiple times with the valve achieving the required MART on all occasions.	No further action was required at this time; valve will be tested again during the Annual ESD in June 2025.
9-Mar-25	During Christmas tree valve function test, gas bubbles were observed weeping from the valve stem of the Production Wing Valve (PWV) when the valve was moved into an open position.	6.8.3. Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Loss of Well Containment (MEE-01) PS 12.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical PSs to prevent	A series of bubble capture tests were conducted. The PWV was cycled three time (closed to open) while the well was not flowing and the SCSSV open. The average leak rate from the PWV stem	Performed an Operational Risk Assessment (ORA-01891) to ensure risk of LoC is ALARP and whether safe to continue (Actions continue to be performed under the ORA). Issue Ops Instructions to always close PMV when PWV	No further action taken (Actions continue to be performed under the ORA).

		environment risk related damage to SCEs for: • P10 – Wells to: – ensure that a well retains the mechanical integrity to contain reservoir fluids within the well envelope at all times to avoid a MEE. Including operate phase environmentally critical equipment for pressure containment, structures, monitoring and isolating systems associated with the well.	seal was 7.6 liters per hour. A decision was made to flow LH3 to investigate the weep behaviour at flowing conditions. During the flow test, the leak reduced to 1 liter per hour. Throughout the entire observation period, no presence of heavy hydrocarbons or oil was detected.	requires closing to isolate the well. Opportunistic inspection during upcoming ROV campaign.	

Approved by: [redacted]

pp. [redacted] (Apr 15, 2025 11:26 GMT+8)

Approved by: [redacted]

Apr 15, 2025 12:55 GMT+8)