Please check the following boxes if applicable to this report		Nil Incident Report: ☐		Final report for this activity: ☐	
Titleholder name:	**Woodside Energy Ltd**	**Titleholder business address:**	**Mia Yellagonga, 11 Mount St Perth WA 6000**	**Title of environment plan for the activity:**	**North Rankin Complex Facility Operations Environment Plan [Rev 10]**
Activity type: (e.g. drilling, seismic, production)	**Production**	**Month, Year:**	**March, 2025**	**Facility name and type:** (e.g. MODU, Seismic Vessel, FPSO)	**North Rankin Complex Platform**
Contact person:	[redacted]	**Email:**	[redacted]**@woodside.com**	**Phone:**	[redacted]

Incident date	All material facts and circumstances (including release volumes to environment if applicable)	Performance outcome(s) and/or standard(s) breached	Action taken to avoid or mitigate any adverse environmental impacts of the incident	Corrective action taken, or proposed, to stop, control or remedy this incident	Action taken, or proposed, to prevent a similar incident occurring in future
11-Mar-25	Failure of two safety critical valves on trunkline corrosion inhibitor skid. This is a potential loss of containment due to a potential backflow of high pressure gas into a low pressure system.	Yes, 5.8.5 Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Topsides Loss of Containment (MEE-03) PS 14.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 6.1.5.2) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • F06 – Safety Instrumented System to; - detect and respond to predefined initiating conditions to protect mechanical integrity and prevent loss of containment (including uncontrolled diesel transfer/overflow) • F21 – Relief Systems to; - protect pressurised equipment, equipment exposed to high pressures and piping from a loss of containment to prevent escalation to a MEE.	None, no impact to environment	The corrosion inhibitor pump was isolated until further investigation	Replace valves. Develop PRT/Procedure for Pressure Rise testing to meet Performance standard criteria goal, to ensure reliable, consistent testing methodology. Determine mechanical failure cause by examination of passing check valves, failure mode to be documented to determine frequency of testing required and consideration of frequency of testing of "like" systems (MEG).

3-Mar-25	Diesel main ring piping loss of primary containment on topsides	Yes, 5.8.5 Unplanned Hydrocarbon Release: Topsides Loss of Containment (MEE-03) PS 14.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 6.1.5.2) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • P01 – Pressure Vessels • P02 – Heat Exchangers • P03 – Rotating Equipment • P08 – Piping Systems; to together: - provide minimum required mechanical integrity for identified SCE systems (piping, heat exchangers, rotating equipment, and pressure vessel) for operation within defined integrity limits so as to prevent a loss of containment that may result in a MEE.	Stopped leak with clamp, no impact to environment as liquid contained in drainage system	Inspected and pressure retaining clamp applied to affected area to stop weep.	Replacement of corroded pipe and establishing a remediation plan.

Approved by: [redacted]

[redacted] (Apr 11, 2025 16:41 GMT+8)

Approved by: [redacted]

[redacted] Apr 15, 2025 15:42 GMT+8)