

Please check the following boxes if applicable to this report			Nil Incident Report: ☐		Final report for this activity: ☐	
Titleholder name:	Woodside Energy Ltd	Titleholder business address:	Mia Yellagonga, 11 Mount St Perth WA 6000	Title of environment plan for the activity:	Goodwyn Alpha Facility Operations Environment Plan [Rev 13]	
Activity type: (e.g. drilling, seismic, production)	Production	Month, Year:	June, 2025	Facility name and type: (e.g. MODU, Seismic Vessel, FPSO)	Goodwyn Alpha Platform	
Contact person:		Email:	@woodside.com	Phone:		
Incident date	All material facts and circumstances (including release volumes to environment if applicable)	Performance outcome(s) and/or standard(s) breached	Action taken to avoid or mitigate any adverse environmental impacts of the incident	Corrective action taken, or proposed, to stop, control or remedy this incident	Action taken, or proposed, to prevent a similar incident occurring in future	
30-Jun-25	Routine inspection of the East Crane luff rope revealed multiple broken wires and damage, failing the P20 Performance Standard.	PS 18.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • P20 – Lifting Equipment to; – prevent platform lifting equipment failure or dropped/swinging loads that could result in a MEE by maintaining lifting equipment integrity.	No environmental impact.	Following identification of the defect, the crane was taken out of service as a precaution to enable further inspection tasks and completion of fitness for service analysis. A preliminary fitness for service analysis conducted indicated that replacement is required. The crane will remain out of service until rope replacement is completed.	Further investigation will occur to determine causal factors related to life cycle and degradation of luff rope.	

23-Jun-25	During 3-monthly maintenance inspections of the West Crane the emergency crane operating system was found in the tripped state, failing the P20 Performance Standard.	PS 18.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • P20 – Lifting Equipment to; – prevent platform lifting equipment failure or dropped/swinging loads that could result in a MEE by maintaining lifting equipment integrity.	No environmental impact.	The crane was taken out of service and fault finding was conducted. It was identified that a circuit breaker had tripped in the control panel. The circuit breaker was reset, and the emergency operating system was tested successfully with no issues. The crane was returned to service.	Engineering have been engaged to assist in investigating why there was no alarm to indicate that the emergency operating system was unavailable. Crane daily pre-use check now includes power up of the emergency operating system to ensure functionality. Once the engineering investigation is complete and an engineered solution is assessed and implemented, a review of the ongoing use of the procedural control and any actions as a result of the engineering assessment will be implemented.
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6-Jun-25	During the GWA 2025 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) test some shutdown and blowdown valves failed to meet their required maximum allowable response time (MART). An MOC has been raised to capture the deviation from the F06 performance standard, and to capture the long-term remediation tasks on these valves.	PS 15.3 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 7.1.5) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • F06 – Safety Instrumented System to; – detect and respond to pre-defined initiating conditions and initiate responses that function to put the process plant, equipment, and the wells in a safe condition through appropriate isolation of hazardous inventories so as to prevent or mitigate the effects of a MEE. • F09 – Depressurisation (Blowdown) to; – safely depressurise the installation in order to avoid or minimise the escalation of an uncontrolled loss of containment. • F22 – Open Hazardous Drains to; – prevent escalation of an incident following loss of containment, fire and/or explosion by removing or containing flammable liquid from hazardous areas; and	No environmental impact.	Actions included cycling the valves and deeming them functional, or placing under isolation.	Engineering to review failures and reliability trends and identify further actions, as required. Identified valves are all scheduled for replacement.
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