

Please check the following boxes if applicable to this report				Nil Incident Report: ☐		Final report for this activity: ☐	
Titleholder name:	Woodside Energy Ltd	Titleholder business address:	Mia Yellagonga, 11 Mount St Perth WA 6000	Title of environment plan for the activity:	North Rankin Complex Facility Operations Environment Plan [Rev 10]		
Activity type: (e.g. drilling, seismic, production)	Production	Month, Year:	June, 2025	Facility name and type: (e.g. MODU, Seismic Vessel, FPSO)	North Rankin Complex Platform		
Contact person:		Email:	@woodside.com	Phone:			
Incident date	All material facts and circumstances (including release volumes to environment if applicable)	Performance outcome(s) and/or standard(s) breached	Action taken to avoid or mitigate any adverse environmental impacts of the incident	Corrective action taken, or proposed, to stop, control or remedy this incident	Action taken, or proposed, to prevent a similar incident occurring in future		

16-Jun-25	Level Transmitter 55LZIT2811 on Train 200 Production Separator failed, initiating a Process Shut Down (PSD), shutting in flow from the Train 200 wells. Being the transmitter a safety critical equipment, the event resulted in failure of performance standard F06.	PS 14.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 6.1.5.2) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • F06 – Safety Instrumented System to; - detect and respond to predefined initiating conditions to protect mechanical integrity and prevent loss of containment (including uncontrolled diesel transfer/overflow) • F21 – Relief Systems to; - protect pressurised equipment, equipment exposed to high pressures and piping from a loss of containment to prevent escalation to a MEE.	No environmental impact. PSD ensured all equipment was in a safe state. No integrity limits were exceeded; the process was stabilised and continued to operate at reduced production rates.	Instrumentation operator removed the transmitter and replaced with new unit. Old transmitter was examined in the workshop, but no immediate insights into mechanism of failure were observed. Past performance was reviewed, and no issues found.	Transmitter has been in service for several years. Probable failure due to equipment degradation. No further action required.
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8-Jun-25	Whittaker lifeboat "Mike" VHF marine radio not functioning. Failure of Safety Critical Communications performance standard E04.	PS 12.2 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 6.1.5.2) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • E04 - Safety Critical Communication Systems to; - allow effective Emergency Response (ER) communications in emergencies, including; - o Internal Communications such as audible and visual warning systems, and voice communications during emergency events - o External Communications such as voice communications to adjacent facilities, aircraft and vessels, and external incident control centres during emergency events.	No environmental impact.	As a mitigation for the inoperable VHF radio a handheld radio has been installed in the survival craft "Mike" and is checked and tested on a weekly basis when completing the lifeboat assurance task.	Event represents an age-related failure. The weekly assurance task identified the issue as per intended function. New VHF Marine radio is scheduled for replacement in August Comms Campaign.
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26-Jun-25	North Rankin Module 2 subsea isolation valve (SSIV) 9917 structural support platform presents severe corrosion. Failure of Performance Standard P07 - Topsides Surface Structure.	PS 15.1 Integrity will be managed in accordance with SCE Management Procedure (Section 6.1.5.2) and SCE technical Performance Standard(s) to prevent environment risk related Damage to SCEs for: • P07 – Substructures • P21 – Topsides / Surface Structures to both; - provide and maintain structural integrity to support SCE systems under all design conditions through service life; and to; - prevent structural failure from contributing to the escalation of a MEE by providing support/protection of SCE systems during an emergency event, and/or support containment of environmentally hazardous material (including hazardous and closed drain caissons).	No environmental impact.	Preliminary Fitness for Service Assessment (FFSA) and restrict access to SSIV platform.	- Ongoing Structural Fitness for Service Assessment (FFSA) for the operating case (outside cyclone season) and for the extreme storm condition (inside cyclone season). - Temporary scaffolding to be installed to supplement structure prior to remediation. - Execute permanent remediation of the SSIV platform.
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