

Notifiable incident

Incident ID [5552](#)

Duty holder: Shell Australia Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity: Prelude FLNG
Facility type: Floating liquefied natural gas facility

Incident details	
Division	Occupational Health and Safety
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	29/08/2018 11:20 AM (WST)
Notification date	29/08/2018 02:17 PM (WST)
NOPSEMA response date	29/08/2018 02:55 PM (WST)
Received by	[REDACTED]
Nearest state	WA
Initial category type <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category <i>(based on notification)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
3 Day report received	31/08/2018
Final report received	27/09/2018
All required data received	27/09/2018
Final category type <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category <i>(based on final report)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
Brief description	OHS-DSCE-Damage to essential diesel generator enclosure
Location	Engine room
Subtype/s	Other
Summary <i>(at notification)</i>	Operator advised the following fire damper testing, it was identified that the enclosure for EDG10 had been damaged in that it appears to have inwardly collapsed. The current thinking is that limited air in the compartment due to the HVAC damper testing starved the machine of air thus causing a vacuum which resulted in the enclosure deforming. The machine was taken off line to conduct further investigation work. The compartment had full F&G capability at all times but the operator believes that the damaged enclosure could affect the means to contain a fire.
Details <i>(from final report)</i>	Operator advised the following fire damper testing, it was identified that the enclosure for EDG10 had been damaged in that it appears to have inwardly collapsed. The current thinking is that limited air in the compartment due to the HVAC damper testing starved the machine of air thus causing a vacuum which resulted in the enclosure deforming. The machine was taken off line to conduct further investigation work. The compartment had full F&G capability at all times but the operator believes that the damaged enclosure could affect the means to contain a fire.
Immediate cause/s	Through the causal investigation it was determined that the damage to the doors was a direct result of a vacuum being created in the EDG room. This vacuum was created when: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• All 3 dampers to the room were closed simultaneously for testing• The EDG fire doors were closed per design.• The EDG was in operation.
Root cause/s	ED - DESIGN - Design specs - problem not anticipated
Root cause description	Through the causal investigation it was determined that the damage to the doors was a direct result of a vacuum being created in the EDG room. This vacuum was created when: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• All 3 dampers to the room were closed simultaneously for testing• The EDG fire doors were closed per design.• The EDG was in operation.

Duty inspector recommendation	
Date	29/08/2018
Duty inspector	[REDACTED]
Recommendation	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Major investigation decision	
Date	29/08/2018
Decision	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Non-major investigation review and recommendation	
Date	29/08/2018
Inspector	[REDACTED]
Risk gap	Moderate
Type of standard	Established
Initial strategy	Investigate

Recommended follow up strategy	
Recommended strategy	Investigate
Supporting considerations	Significant consequence possible due to potential inability to contain a fire - moderate risk gap.

Non-major investigation decision	
Date	29/08/2018
RoN	[REDACTED]
RoN review result	Agree with recommendation
Strategy decision	Investigate
Supporting considerations	

Associated inspection	
Inspection ID	1829