

Notifiable incident

Incident ID [5742](#)

Duty holder: INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity: Ichthys Venturer
Facility type: Floating production storage and offloading facility

Incident details	
Division	Occupational Health and Safety
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	24/12/2018 03:50 PM (WST)
Notification date	24/12/2018 05:07 PM (WST)
NOPSEMA response date	24/12/2018 05:45 PM (WST)
Received by	[REDACTED]
Nearest state	WA
Initial category type <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category <i>(based on notification)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
3 Day report received	27/12/2018
Final report received	27/12/2018
All required data received	27/12/2018
Final category type <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category <i>(based on final report)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
Brief description	OHS-DSCE - Deluge release button developed a fault.
Location	
Subtype/s	Emergency response, Facility integrity, Muster
Summary <i>(at notification)</i>	<p>The OIM of the Ichthys Venturer FPSO facility reported at 15:50 hours on 24/12/2018, the facility had an ESD1 in a non-hazardous area. The incident indication was a deluge release on Module 6 and 7 level of the pipe rack. The indication was the local release deluge button had been activated. The button is tag # S790DEM7755. The facility has a General Alarm and a Muster and all personnel were accounted for. Further investigation through the CCR and CCTV indicated no indication of fire anywhere and it was incident of just deluge releasing.</p> <p>The ERT was deployed to investigate, the deluge was re-set, and appeared that the deluge button had a fault or somewhere on the deluge circuit. The muster was stood down at 16:20 hours and investigation has commenced. Power is being restored to the facility.</p>

<p>Details (from final report)</p>	<p>The OIM of the Ichthys Venturer FPSO facility reported at 15:50 hours on 24/12/2018, the facility had an ESD1 in a non-hazardous area. The incident indication was a deluge release on Module 6 and 7 level of the pipe rack. The indication was the local release deluge button had been activated. The button is tag # S790DEM7755. The facility has a General Alarm and a Muster and all personnel were accounted for. Further investigation through the CCR and CCTV indicated no indication of fire anywhere and it was incident of just deluge releasing.</p> <p>The ERT was deployed to investigate, the deluge was re-set, and appeared that the deluge button had a fault or somewhere on the deluge circuit. The muster was stood down at 16:20 hours and investigation has commenced. Power is being restored to the facility.</p> <p>At 15:50 hrs on the 24th December 2018 the facility experienced an unplanned alarm resulting in a General Alarm (GA) and release of fire water deluge in Module 6/7 pipe rack.</p> <p>FPSO Venturer facility mustered and all persons were accounted for.</p> <p>The initiator was an activation of the deluge release button fault on S790DEM775 on module 6/7 pipe rack.</p> <p>The Emergency Response Team (ERT) was mobilised to investigate and found no indication of fire in Module 5/6/7/8 pipe rack.</p> <p>Deluge was reset.</p> <p>FPSO Venturer facility returned to normal status at 20:47 hrs.</p> <p>Internal INPEX incident investigation has commenced in accordance with the INPEX Event Reporting & Investigation Procedure.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FPSO Venturer facility mustered and all persons were accounted for. • The Emergency Response Team (ERT) was mobilised to investigate and found no indication of fire in module 5/6/7/8 pipe rack. • Investigation commenced. <p>Investigate manual deluge push button S790DEM775 loop terminations for tightness and integrity.</p> <p>Internal INPEX incident investigation (5 whys), was completed in accordance with the INPEX Event Reporting & Investigation Procedure.</p> <p>Why did the facility experience an unplanned General Alarm (GA) and release of fire water deluge in Module 6/7 pipe rack?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deluge release button fault on S790DEM775 <p>Why did the Deluge Release Button S790DEM775 go into fault?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One of the two switches (Burgess V3SYRUL 3614K) within the circuit failed. <p>Why did the switch fail?</p> <p>Switches were tested in situ with a multimeter for circuit continuity and it was discovered the switch contacts were not making or breaking.</p> <p>After removing the two switch components from the unit, there was a clear difference between the two. One had a distinct clicking/contact noise when pressed while the other did not open or close, as per design.</p> <p>Referring to the termination drawing, this loss of contact from one failed switch will cause the Deluge Release Button to activate.</p> <p>Complete fault analysis on failed switch. (Burgess V3SYRUL 3614K)</p>
<p>Immediate cause/s</p>	<p>Faulty deluge release button / switch. Failed switch in manual deluge push button S790DEM775.</p>
<p>Root cause/s</p>	<p>ED - EQUIPMENT / PARTS DEFECT - QC</p>
<p>Root cause description</p>	<p>After removing the two switch components from the unit, there was a clear difference between the two. One had a distinct clicking/contact noise when pressed while the other did not open or close, as per design.</p>

<p>Duty inspector recommendation</p>	
<p>Date</p>	<p>26/12/2018</p>
<p>Duty inspector</p>	<p>██████████</p>
<p>Recommendation</p>	<p>Do not conduct Major Investigation</p>
<p>Reasoning</p>	<p>Does not meet MI threshold based on information received</p>
<p>Supporting considerations</p>	<p></p>

Major investigation decision	
Date	26/12/2018
Decision	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Non-major investigation review and recommendation	
Date	27/12/2018
Inspector	
Risk gap	None
Type of standard	Established
Initial strategy	Inclusion in annual stats/data analysis

Recommended follow up strategy	
Recommended strategy	Inclusion in annual report stats / data analysis
Supporting considerations	No credible significant or serious consequence from unplanned activation of the deluge. Likelihood of any credible consequence is negligible. Therefore, no risk gap. relevant incident history - a number of infantile (solenoid) failures on deluge systems during 2018.

Non-major investigation decision	
Date	07/01/2019
RoN	
RoN review result	Agree with recommendation
Strategy decision	Inclusion in annual report stats / data analysis
Supporting considerations	Agreed.

Associated inspection	
Inspection ID	