

Notifiable incident

Incident ID [5423](#)

Duty holder: INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity: Ichthys Venturer
Facility type: Floating production storage and offloading facility

Incident details	
Division	Occupational Health and Safety
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	24/05/2018 09:18 AM (WST)
Notification date	24/05/2018 11:58 AM (WST)
NOPSEMA response date	24/05/2018 12:26 PM (WST)
Received by	[REDACTED]
Nearest state	WA
Initial category type <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category <i>(based on notification)</i>	Unplanned event - implement emergency response plan
3 Day report received	27/05/2018
Final report received	27/05/2018
All required data received	27/05/2018
Final category type <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category <i>(based on final report)</i>	Unplanned event - implement emergency response plan
Brief description	OHS-UPE- Inadvertent operation of helideck fire water (DIFF) system
Location	Accommodation and amenities
Subtype/s	Alarm, Emergency response, Helicopter, Muster
Summary <i>(at notification)</i>	<p>- At 9:18 hrs activation of the Helideck Fire Water (DIFF) System was detected by the ICSS (Control Room);</p> <p>- activation was located at push button located in forward staircase;</p> <p>- suspect a fault in push button and currently being investigated;</p> <p>- No personnel was in the vicinity of the area when activation occurred.</p> <p>- Activation triggered GA and Full Muster was achieved.</p> <p>Second helicopter was inbound and diverted to CPF. remaining helicopters (2) were received at Jascon-25.</p> <p>The OIM mentioned that does not appear as restriction to receive future Helicopter at the facility and troubleshooting will continue on the faulty button.</p>

Details <i>(from final report)</i>	<p>- At 9:18 hrs activation of the Helideck Fire Water (DIFF) System was detected by the ICSS (Control Room);</p> <p>- activation was located at push button located in forward staircase;</p> <p>- suspect a fault in push button and currently being investigated;</p> <p>- No personnel was in the vicinity of the area when activation occurred.</p> <p>- Activation triggered GA and Full Muster was achieved.</p> <p>Second helicopter was inbound and diverted to CPF. remaining helicopters (2) were received at Jascon-25.</p> <p>The OIM mentioned that does not appear as restriction to receive future Helicopter at the facility and troubleshooting will continue on the faulty button.</p> <p>The FPSO ICSS Engineer, FPSO Inlec and FPSO HSE Advisor conducted an investigation in accordance with the INPEX Event Reporting & Investigation Procedure.</p> <p>On investigation the Heli deck manual push button deluge release S-794-DEM-603 on the FWD emergency escape stairs of the Heli deck was found to have water ingress into the button enclosure causing the false activation.</p> <p>There are another 2 x Heli deck manual push button deluge release buttons (S-794-DEM-601 & S-794-DEM-602) on each of the Port and Starboard emergency escape stairs of the Heli deck, both have been inspected and found fit for service.</p>
Immediate cause/s	Fault in push button activated helideck DIFF System. Heli deck deluge push button point S794DEM603 false activation.
Root cause/s	ED - Rpt Failure - MGMT SYS - Corrective action - CA NI
Root cause description	On investigation the manual push button S-794-DEM-603 on the FWD emergency escape stairs of the Heli deck was found to have water ingress into the button enclosure causing the false activation. Equipment difficulty – Repeat failure

Duty inspector recommendation

Date	24/05/2018
Duty inspector	[REDACTED]
Recommendation	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Major investigation decision

Date	24/05/2018
Decision	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Non-major investigation review and recommendation

Date	25/05/2018
Inspector	[REDACTED]
Risk gap	None
Type of standard	Established
Initial strategy	Inclusion in annual stats/data analysis

Recommended follow up strategy

Recommended strategy	Inclusion in annual report stats / data analysis
Supporting considerations	Health and safety consequences to members of the workforce are not credible from the described event. Likelihood remains at negligible. Therefore no risk gap. Established standard - CAP 437.

Non-major investigation decision	
Date	28/05/2018
RoN	
RoN review result	Agree with recommendation
Strategy decision	Inclusion in annual report stats / data analysis
Supporting considerations	

Associated inspection	
Inspection ID	