

# Notifiable incident

**Incident ID** [5159](#)

**Duty holder:** INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd  
**Facility/Activity:** Ichthys Venturer  
**Facility type:** Floating production storage and offloading facility

Incident details	
<b>Division</b>	Occupational Health and Safety
<b>Notification type</b>	Incident
<b>Incident date</b>	28/11/2017 05:00 PM (WST)
<b>Notification date</b>	28/11/2017 06:08 PM (WST)
<b>NOPSEMA response date</b>	28/11/2017 07:20 PM (WST)
<b>Received by</b>	[REDACTED]
<b>Nearest state</b>	WA
<b>Initial category type</b> <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
<b>Initial category</b> <i>(based on notification)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
<b>3 Day report received</b>	01/12/2017
<b>Final report received</b>	22/12/2017
<b>All required data received</b>	22/12/2017
<b>Final category type</b> <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
<b>Final category</b> <i>(based on final report)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
<b>Brief description</b>	OHS-DSCE- Fire dampers found with locking devices
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Subtype/s</b>	Facility integrity
<b>Summary</b> <i>(at notification)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- As a follow up from a recent finding on the INPEX Ichthys CPF Explorer, the OIM reported that on the Venturer they started inspecting fire dampers to check for locking devices</li><li>- on initial inspection found 4 out of 30 fire dampers having locking devices installed preventing them from closing on demand</li><li>- the inspection and investigation will continue as the OIM reported that the facility having in the order of 900 fire dampers in total</li></ul>

<b>Details</b> <i>(from final report)</i>	<p>- As a follow up from a recent finding on the INPEX Ichthys CPF Explorer, the OIM reported that on the Venturer they started inspecting fire dampers to check for locking devices</p> <p>- on initial inspection found 4 out of 30 fire dampers having locking devices installed preventing them from closing on demand</p> <p>- the inspection and investigation will continue as the OIM reported that the facility having in the order of 900 fire dampers in total</p> <p>There have been nil activities completed on the fire dampers since FPSO sail-away from Korea; therefore, it is likely that locking pins were in place at the time of inspection prior to FPSO sail-away from Korea, which was witnessed and accepted by DNV-GL. The faults were not identified during inspection due to insufficient sample size (Root Cause: Work Direction – Preparation – Work Package Needs Improvement).</p> <p>Planned maintenance (6 monthly) of Fire Dampers was scheduled to occur in December, in accordance with 'H01014 Fire Damper Function Test – Fire Damper Instrumentation (X060-AE-MWI-60010). An improvement to this MWI was also identified (see action below).</p> <p>A third party contractor MIZCO has been engaged to complete an Instrument Function Test of 100% of fire dampers, with all inoperable dampers to be rectified upon identification. Output of inspections shall include an Inspection Functional Test Sheet for all sub-systems, to be summarised in a final inspection report (see action below).</p>
<b>Immediate cause/s</b>	Locking devices found in fire dampers after information shared from CPF facility
<b>Root cause/s</b>	HPD - WORK DIRECTION - Preparation - work package / permit NI
<b>Root cause description</b>	Root Cause: Work Direction – Preparation – Work Package Needs Improvement. As there have been nil activities completed on fire dampers since FPSO sail-away from Korea; it is likely that the locking pins were in place at the time of inspection in Korea.

<b>Duty inspector recommendation</b>	
<b>Date</b>	29/11/2017
<b>Duty inspector</b>	██████████
<b>Recommendation</b>	Do not conduct Major Investigation
<b>Reasoning</b>	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
<b>Supporting considerations</b>	

<b>Major investigation decision</b>	
<b>Date</b>	30/11/2017
<b>Decision</b>	Do not conduct Major Investigation
<b>Reasoning</b>	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
<b>Supporting considerations</b>	

<b>Non-major investigation review and recommendation</b>	
<b>Date</b>	06/12/2017
<b>Inspector</b>	██████████
<b>Risk gap</b>	Moderate
<b>Type of standard</b>	Established
<b>Initial strategy</b>	Investigate

**Recommended follow up strategy**

<b>Recommended strategy</b>	Investigate
<b>Supporting considerations</b>	<p>The 3 days report states 2 out of 30 dampers inspected were found with the manual locking device installed. 4 dampers were found with the linkages loose or disconnected. These dampers would not have actuated on demand from the ICSS.</p> <p>█ (INPEX) provided further details on 30/11/2017.</p> <p>"2 dampers were manually locked open.</p> <p>S-311-HZF-347 / LQ Level 5, Primary Muster Area / Fire Damper.</p> <p>S-311-HZF-158 / LQ Level 2, A-220, HVAC &amp; Elec Shaft / Fire Damper.</p> <p>4 Dampers with the linkages loose or disconnected</p> <p>S-311-HZF-980 / LQ Level 7 , A-704 FCU Plantroom / Fire Damper</p> <p>S-311-HZF-158 / LQ Level 2, A-220, HVAC &amp; Elec Shaft / Fire Damper.</p> <p>S-311-HZF-147 / LQ Level 2, A-217, Stair way / Fire Damper.</p> <p>S-311-HZF-128 / LQ Level 2, A-220, HVAC &amp; Elec Shaft / Fire Damper.</p> <p>These are fire dampers and not associated with inergen protected spaces. █</p> <p>Final report indicates all fire dampers are to be inspected and function tested by end of Dec. Work includes removal of locking arrangement █. INPEX has also updated H014014 Fire Damper Function Test procedure to include visual inspection by sampling. █</p>

**Non-major investigation decision**

<b>Date</b>	23/01/2018
<b>RoN</b>	█
<b>RoN review result</b>	Agree with recommendation
<b>Strategy decision</b>	Investigate
<b>Supporting considerations</b>	

**Associated inspection**

<b>Inspection ID</b>	1695
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