

Notifiable incident

Incident ID [5494](#)

Duty holder: INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity: CPF Ichthys Explorer
Facility type: Other platform with accommodation facilities when drilling/workover facilities are not in commission

Incident details	
Division	Occupational Health and Safety
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	17/07/2018 04:00 PM (WST)
Notification date	17/07/2018 10:13 PM (WST)
NOPSEMA response date	18/07/2018 08:26 AM (WST)
Received by	[REDACTED]
Nearest state	WA
Initial category type <i>(based on notification)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category <i>(based on notification)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
3 Day report received	20/07/2018
Final report received	14/08/2018
All required data received	14/08/2018
Final category type <i>(based on final report)</i>	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category <i>(based on final report)</i>	Damage to safety-critical equipment
Brief description	OHS - DSCE Water mist system
Location	Process deck
Subtype/s	Valve failure
Summary <i>(at notification)</i>	The water mist system in the active fire protection for the CPF failed to reinstate properly after critical function testing. A part is broken and needs replacement. Manual mode of operation is possible in the meantime.
Details <i>(from final report)</i>	<p>The water mist system in the active fire protection for the CPF failed to reinstate properly after critical function testing. A part is broken and needs replacement. Manual mode of operation is possible in the meantime.</p> <p>During routine maintenance function checks on the water mist systems across the CPF, a number of the remote activation solenoids were identified as being faulty. The system is currently only able to be released manually from the local control panel. This situation prevents the system from meeting the Active Fire Protection Performance Standard relating to automatic operation from the Fire & Gas system.</p> <p>Affected systems are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- HPU Room Column 1 (*)- HPU Room Column 4- Paint Store (*)- MEG Pumps- Fire Water Pump C <p>(*) manual activation associated HPU Col 1 and Paint Store were previously advised to NOPSEMA via Dangerous Occurrence Notice on 20 and 22 July respectively.</p> <p>It is noted that the all other water mist systems including EDGs, MPGs and remaining Firewater Pumps are functional in accordance with the performance standard.</p>
Immediate cause/s	Solenoid failure.

Root cause/s	ED - DESIGN - Design specs - problem not anticipated
Root cause description	O-ring damage due to manufacturing/design issue. Moisture ingress caused corrosion and damage to internal components. Minor debris within water mist tubing.

Duty inspector recommendation

Date	18/07/2018
Duty inspector	██████████
Recommendation	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Major investigation decision

Date	18/07/2018
Decision	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Does not meet MI threshold based on information received
Supporting considerations	

Non-major investigation review and recommendation

Date	18/07/2018
Inspector	██████████
Risk gap	Moderate
Type of standard	Established
Initial strategy	Investigate

Recommended follow up strategy

Recommended strategy	Investigate
Supporting considerations	Followed up with ██████████ (INPEX) - the water mist system is related to AFP covering the HPU room in column 01. The system fault was identified as outcomes of 6 monthly CFT (i.e. good PM finding) . The water mist system has 2 solenoid valves. One of the 2 solenoid valves was unable to reseat hence the system was unable to remain in auto mode. The system is fully functional in manual mode and providing full firefighting duties and coverage. There were past notification related to water mist system during IHUC. I suggest that we followed up the notification in PI 1776 (due in Sept 2018). The failed solenoid valve appears to be equipment issue rather than inspection, testing and repair issues, however, we will confirm the nature of the failure as well as critical system parts and sparing requirements. ██████████

Non-major investigation decision

Date	23/07/2018
RoN	██████████
RoN review result	Agree with recommendation
Strategy decision	Investigate
Supporting considerations	

Associated inspection

Inspection ID	1776
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