

Contents

From the CEO	1
Asset integrity management	2
Oil spill response planning	3
Competency assurance	4
Hand-arm vibration	4
NOPSEMA resources	4
Seismic survey planning	5
Safety alert #54	6
Changes to regulation	7
Safety-critical equipment	7
Ageing facilities	8
Environmental foundations	9
Activity and performance	10
Assessments	10
Inspections	11
Complaints	11
Injuries	11
Enforcements	11
Notifications received	12
Upcoming events	13
Glossary of acronyms	

From the CEO

Like many of you, I relish the opportunity at the start of a year or planning cycle to take stock of objectives, question priorities and improve plans to deliver them. But even with the best intentions, our objectives and the way we pursue them will be influenced by other factors. Some factors will be beyond our control, many we will seek to influence and a few will spur us to do even better.



Australia's offshore oil and gas industry is rightly expected by government, shareholders and the wider community to develop oil and gas resources while building a reputation for safety and environmental responsibility. Industry leaders regularly share with their stakeholders how they are investing in more advanced systems, better training, safer working conditions and the least risky way of doing business offshore. They often share new data and insights on the environment in which they operate.

Operators have a responsibility to manage changes that occur routinely on their facilities, be it a planned change or response to an unforeseen development. There is also a clear expectation that the offshore industry, as a whole, should have a ready capacity to manage change in order to continuously improve the way they run their operations.

In light of the lessons from past experiences, the regulatory regime that NOPSEMA administers allows industry to manage risks within a flexible framework. This does not mean operators 'get off lightly' compared to those in more prescriptive regimes. Australia's regulatory framework encourages continuous improvement and avoids a focus on unnecessary prescriptive requirements which can stifle innovation. NOPSEMA expects operators to rise to the challenge and demonstrate how they are reducing risks for any petroleum activity offshore, be it a seismic survey, complex drilling activity or a long-term production project. In return, I welcome the challenge of meeting your high expectations of NOPSEMA in 2013. I am confident that, in the end, our mutual track records will speak for themselves.



Jane Cutler
CEO

"Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it."

George Bernard Shaw



Asset integrity management - changes in operating conditions

During an inspection of an offshore production facility, NOPSEMA examined the operator's response to a change in produced gas composition. The operator had initiated a review of materials compatibility against the new gas composition. The review, however, focused on the metallic constituent of the containment barriers. NOPSEMA recommended the operator also consider the type of materials used for seals across the facility. The further review identified a number of vessels, pumps and valves with seals that were incompatible with the produced gas, raising the risk of an unplanned hydrocarbon release (HCR).

The operator's initial approach is not an isolated case and the final findings demonstrate the value of a comprehensive review of seal materials following a change in gas composition. Furthermore, data from incidents reported to NOPSEMA since 2005 shows that seals and gaskets account for 14% of all unplanned hydrocarbon releases. NOPSEMA data shows that nearly 20% of the 1-300kg unplanned gas releases are linked to seal failures, of which 44% are due to incompatible seal materials with operating conditions.

The *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006* (OPGGSA) states that operators have a duty to take all reasonably practicable steps to provide and maintain a safe physical environment on a facility (OPGGSA, Sch 3, clause 9(2)(a)). Operators should ensure that all containment materials remain appropriate whenever a fluid composition changes or new chemical is used, or when any other operating conditions change, in order to reduce risks to as low as reasonably practicable. Seal materials can be susceptible to chemicals and operating conditions, including methanol, H₂S dry or wet, monoethanolamine (MEA), corrosion inhibitors (often amine based), triethylene glycol (TEG), temperature, explosive decompression and static/dynamic application. Operators should consider the implications of any significant change to these conditions, with the assistance of their suppliers.

Future issues of the *Regulator* will feature articles on other aspects of managing the risk of unplanned hydrocarbon releases.

Seal failures in unplanned hydrocarbon releases - 2005 to Nov 2012

Volume (kg/litre)	Number reported	Number involving seals/gaskets	% involving seals/gaskets
HCR 1-300 kg	129	25	19%
HCR >300 kg	21	1	5%
HCR 80-12500l	28	1	4%
HCR >12500l	1	0	0%



Courtesy of Woodside



Courtesy of the LA Times

Oil spill response planning: why wait?

Lessons from major oil spills in Australia and overseas document the advantages of preparing response scenarios ahead of a potential oil spill incident. Effective preparations will reduce pressure on the response team and achieve the best response outcomes in the critical hours immediately following an incident. Every decision that requires consideration during the incident has the potential to delay the response process, resulting in environmental impacts that could have been avoided.

The nature of offshore oil and gas activities offer an advantage for oil spill response planning, in particular obtaining regulatory approvals for the use of dispersants. Traditionally, lodging applications for such approvals has only been possible after an oil spill occurs. In the past this has not been appropriate for shipping spills, which involve a number of variables, such as the type of oil the vessel is carrying and the location of a possible spill. These variables cannot always be documented in a response plan and instead must be evaluated when an incident occurs.

In the case of planning and response for spills from offshore petroleum facilities or activities, however, there is more certainty around these variables. The location

of the facility or activity and oil type are known, and an assessment of environmental impacts and risks is completed, well in advance of the activity commencing. This means the spill risk and response strategies can be more clearly defined based on situational data, allowing for a more timely oil spill response if the need arises.

Under the OPGGS Act and Environment Regulations, if an operator wishes to use dispersants as a management measure for oil spills, they are required to state their case within an oil spill contingency plan as part of an environment plan assessment by NOPSEMA. If proposing to spray dispersant, operators are required to demonstrate that the use of dispersant reduces overall risks to as low as reasonably practicable and to an acceptable level.

In addition to the OPGGS Act and Regulations, further information on oil spill planning is available on the "Environmental resources" page at nopsema.gov.au. These include [GN 1074 – Guidance Note – Environment plan content requirements](#) and [GN 0940 – Guidance Note – Oil Spill Contingency Planning](#).



Information on competency assurance

Competency assurance is defined as the formal systems, tools, and processes which ensure that personnel are competent to complete assigned tasks to an expected standard. It is a critical aspect of risk management in the offshore petroleum industry. Competency assurance processes, when implemented, contribute to the management of safety and environmental risk. Furthermore, a competent workforce is a necessary component of any approach to reduce occupational health and safety, well integrity and environmental risks to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

NOPSEMA has developed an information paper to assist responsible parties in the design and implementation of effective and robust competency assurance processes. The information paper is the first in a NOPSEMA series focusing on human factors. The series is designed to provide information and advice about the ways in which human factors tools and techniques can be applied to contribute to the reduction of risks to ALARP.

The competency assurance information paper is published on NOPSEMA's ["Human factors" web page](#), which is accessible via the "Resources" menu at nopsema.gov.au.

Hand-arm vibration

Following a recent planned inspection, NOPSEMA made recommendations to a facility operator regarding the potential for workforce exposure to hand-arm vibration. The recommendations addressed the responsibilities of the operator to take steps to help prevent workers suffering injuries caused by vibration during the operation of tools and equipment.

Offshore workers who operate hand-held power tools and hand-guided equipment, such as angle grinders, needle guns, drills and impact wrenches, can suffer poor circulation and damage to nerves, tendons, muscles, bones and joints of the hand and arm. Reducing exposure to hand-arm vibration reduces the risk of these injuries occurring.

There are various control measures, such as effective equipment maintenance and using tools that are fit for purpose, which can help reduce the risk of hand-arm vibration injuries. Combining these with supervision and training will help promote workforce safety. Safe Work Australia has published [information](#) about the risks posed by hand-arm vibration and control measures at safeworkaustralia.com.au



What resources are available to you?

To assist operators and duty holders meet their obligations and fulfil their responsibilities in managing OHS and environmental risks under the *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006* and associated Regulations, NOPSEMA continues to publish a collection of resources on safety, well integrity and environmental management at nopsema.gov.au

The series of resources available to industry include:

- Policies
- Guidelines
- Guidance notes
- Information papers

NOPSEMA also offers a free subscription service through the website to alert stakeholders to information, including guidance and safety alerts. For example, recently NOPSEMA alerted more than 800 environment specialists in industry by email to a series of new [environmental management resources](#). Readers are encouraged to visit the [website](#) to access the full range of current guidance and information and to sign up to the subscription service via the home page.



Streamlining seismic survey environment plans

Operators are required to submit environment plans for seismic surveys to NOPSEMA for assessment prior to commencing these activities in addition to meeting other maritime legislation. Given shorter durations and less complexity compared to production, for example, some seismic operators are challenged by the time and effort required to have a plan accepted by NOPSEMA.

In 2012, NOPSEMA received 35 environment plans (EPs) for seismic surveys, with many submissions requiring the operator to modify and resubmit before the plan could be accepted. EPs accepted on first submission contained the following components that satisfied NOPSEMA that the risks had been adequately assessed. Including these components in an EP is likely to streamline submissions, reducing the effort required to submit a plan that complies with the Environment Regulations, and reducing the effort required by NOPSEMA to assess the EP.

- A well scoped, succinct yet comprehensive description of the activity
- A description of the local environment that may be affected including effects from routine and non-routine events
- A risk assessment informed by the specific circumstances of the activity

Although the impacts and risks from seismic surveys are comparatively low, there is risk associated with a 'cookie cutter' approach to environment plan preparation and risk assessment. This approach can generate

anomalies and lead to inadequate deliberation of the consequence. For example, some EPs attempt to argue that oil spill risk from tank rupture, collision or grounding as not credible and excludable from the risk evaluation.

The Regulations encourage operators to undertake specific risk assessments that evaluate all the local environmental values proximate to the survey, such as world heritage areas, bird sanctuaries, fishing grounds and threatened turtle species, which directly influence the consequence component of risk. Operators who evaluate the consequences of their activities provide NOPSEMA with a more complete demonstration of an acceptable level of risk. Further, the results of this evaluation show suitability of selected control measures, which supports a comprehensive demonstration of reaching ALARP and appropriate environmental performance objectives and standards.

For example, in managing hydrocarbon spill risks environment plans sometimes utilise seismic vessels' shipboard oil pollution emergency plans (SOPEPs) as a surrogate for an oil spill contingency plan (required as part of the EP). SOPEPs detail the preventative control measures in place to limit the extent of the spill. An OSCP must include emergency response arrangements that should mitigate the impacts of a spill. NOPSEMA encourages operators to describe only features of the SOPEP that manage environmental impacts of a spill – instead of providing the SOPEP in full. Where operators' emergency response arrangements rely on AMSA to combat marine pollution the EP still needs to demonstrate that the national arrangements reduce the risks to ALARP in that circumstance.



Courtesy of Woodside

NOPSEMA Safety Alert 54 – scaffolding safety

What happened?

A scaffolder was dismantling a scaffold structure outboard of an offshore platform at a height of approximately 15 metres above the sea when a vertical scaffolding tube (a 'dropper') that was supporting him began to slowly slip. The tube was fixed in place with standard scaffold couplers and the tube was being pulled through these under the weight of the scaffolder.


The scaffolder alerted other workers in the vicinity but they could not reach the connection in time to tighten the coupler. The tube continued to slip through the coupler until the scaffolder fell. Fortunately, the inertia reel harness he was wearing arrested his fall. The scaffolder managed to keep hold of the dropper so that it did not fall into the sea, and was suspended over water for approximately seven minutes. A hook from a rescue winch was swung over to the scaffolder, who attached it to the fall arrest harness, to allow the scaffolder to be pulled up to the platform's walkway.

The investigation found that the scaffolding coupler holding the dropper in place was loose and that there was no check coupler fitted above the dropper tube. It was also found that the rescue equipment used was not suitably rated for the weight of the scaffolder and the associated scaffolding. In addition, some of the certification for the equipment being used during the rescue activities was found to be out of date.

During a subsequent inspection at the facility, a number of fall-protection devices were observed anchored to the bases of hand rail stanchions. The relevant standard on industrial fall-arrest systems and devices (AS/NZS 1891 series) specifies a minimum 15kN capacity for anchor points and it is considered poor practice in the wider industry to use hand rails or stanchions as anchor points.

What could go wrong?

If not for the inertia reel harness arresting the scaffolder's fall, the scaffolder could have fallen several metres to the sea along with other dropped objects, potentially leading to death or serious injury. In addition, deficiencies in equipment rating, certification and regular inspection could have contributed to further failures during rescue activities.



Key lessons


- It is considered good practice to install check couplers above the suspension scaffolding coupler as described in AS/NZS 4576 Guidelines for scaffolding.
- The scaffold should be visually inspected by the work party prior to using the scaffold.
- Scaffolds should be inspected regularly by a competent person.
- Only equipment within its certification period should be used.
- Safety equipment should be suitably rated for the personnel using it.
- Fall arrest equipment should be anchored at a suitably rated anchor point.
- The rescue plan should reflect the hazards the job presents rather than using a generic rescue plan for all scaffold jobs.

The legislation

As per Clause 9 of Schedule 3 to the OPGGS Act 2006: "Operators have a duty of care to take all reasonably practicable steps to ensure that the facility is safe and without risk to the health of any person at or near the facility." This includes an obligation to take all reasonably practicable steps to:

- Ensure that any equipment (including equipment to be used in emergencies) is safe [Clause 9(2)(c)]; and
- Implement and maintain appropriate procedures and equipment for the control of, and response to, emergencies at the facility.

For further information please email alerts@nopsema.gov.au and quote Alert 54. NOPSEMA Safety Alerts are available on the website and through our electronic subscription service at nopsema.gov.au.



Changes to regulation in coastal waters

From 1 January 2013, NOPSEMA no longer has any responsibility in relation to the regulation of occupational health and safety (OHS) in the coastal waters adjacent to the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and South Australia. Coastal waters are the first three nautical miles seaward of the territorial sea base line. As such, NOPSEMA can no longer agree scopes of validation or accept submissions for safety cases, pipeline safety management plans, diving safety management systems or receive diving start-up notices for operations in these coastal waters.

This situation arose from amendments to the OPGGS Act which were implemented at the time of the establishment of NOPSEMA on 1 January 2012. These amendments specified certain limits on, and conditions for, the functions that can be conferred on NOPSEMA under the state or Northern Territory *Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts 1982* (PSLA). These changes included a requirement

that functions relating to *both* OHS and structural (well) integrity regulation must be conferred on NOPSEMA in order for it to perform *either* of these functions. A twelve month grace period to enable states and the Northern Territory to confer structural integrity functions expired on 1 January 2013. Only the Victorian offshore legislation was amended within that period to confer structural integrity (as well as OHS) regulatory functions on NOPSEMA effective from 1 January 2013.

As a result of the above, industry now should contact the relevant state or NT resources department for any OHS regulatory matters in the coastal waters adjacent to the Northern Territory, Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania and South Australia.

Validation of safety critical equipment


QUESTION *If a piece of safety-critical equipment is to be installed on a facility, but is not intended to be used until a later stage in the life of that facility, does it need to be included in the scope of validation for that facility?*

Yes - 'Validation' is an independent assessment of the design, construction and installation of elements of a facility against appropriate standards. The transition from the construction and installation stages of a facility to the operations stage (including commissioning) generally does not carry a requirement for validation. Consequently, any safety-critical equipment needs to be validated before it is installed on a facility. Noting that the validation is in respect of the design, construction and installation of the facility, it is appropriate that safety-critical equipment is validated prior to installation.

Validation is separate from the verification process (i.e. ensuring that the safety-critical equipment is fit for its function and use when installed). Verification is generally not part of the validation required under the Safety Regulations. Verification generally occurs after the equipment is installed and a description of this verification process should be described in the facility safety case. The only triggers in the OPGGSA Act and Safety Regulations for validation are:

- a proposed facility (i.e. new to the regime), or
- the modification or decommissioning of an existing facility.

Visit the safety resources at nopsema.gov.au for more information about [validation](#).





Ageing facilities – management of change

This article in our series on ageing facilities examines why management of change (MoC) is essential for reducing risks to as low as reasonably practicable. Regardless of the source of change on an ageing facility, operators are responsible for having sufficiently robust systems that recognise change and respond accordingly. NOPSEMA inspections have found that not all changes are necessarily captured by formal MoC processes which, typically, are geared towards engineered changes. However, it is important that non-engineering changes (e.g. organisational and procedural change) are also appropriately managed.

Change can arise from a number of sources and may represent a fundamental alteration to a facility's operations. Reduced flows or pressures due to field depletion or the introduction of additional wells or fields being brought on line can result in changes to the hazards originally identified for the facility.

Change does not always result in increased control measures. In some circumstances, particularly those involving reduced operating pressures, a review of existing control measures may indicate that some systems can be reduced or removed. For example, jet flame lengths or inventories may be reduced, making fire protection systems unnecessary. If a new field is brought on line through existing facilities however, *increased* controls measures may be required.

Advances in materials or a halt on manufacturing of parts may render existing fittings obsolete or less preferable. Operators may opt to change out existing equipment in order to take advantage of benefits offered by new materials. For example, many facilities are now using fibre-reinforced plastic (FRP) grating for walkways instead of steel grating. While FRP grating can provide benefits, particularly in relation to ease of installation and absence of corrosion, FRP gratings can also degrade in different ways to steel grating and the level of sustainable damage may also differ. New or revised control measures may be needed.

A major source of change on ageing facilities is damage which can occur from any combination of corrosion, erosion, microbiological attack, wear, impact and many other factors. All items should have some capacity to sustain damage and remain fit for purpose. Items such as pipes and structures are designed to have that capacity delivered through the application of safety factors such as corrosion allowances. Once any damage has been sustained, however, the item has *less* capacity to withstand further damage.

The next and final article in this series will review key points and focus on senior management's role in managing ageing facilities.





Building strong environmental foundations

Companies commence planning their engineered infrastructure for offshore petroleum development well in advance of construction proceeding. The need for this forward planning for complex and high risk offshore petroleum activities is well understood and accepted.

Compared with the level of planning for engineered infrastructure, the same level of effort is not always applied to building strong environmental foundations. This encompasses data collection and other information about the environment that operators gather to:

- support environmental approvals
- demonstrate readiness to mount appropriate responses to environmental emergencies, such as oil spill
- be able to measure their environmental performance throughout the activity.


It is important to recognise that building a strong environmental foundation is not simply limited to data and information about the physical, biological and ecological features of the environment. It also encompasses information regarding the quality and societal values of the environment, such as its social, cultural economic and heritage features.

While some dedicated work is likely to be required, operators should consider opportunities to make the most of work they typically carry out to support planning for engineered infrastructure, to also build environmental foundations. Examples of where opportunities may exist include activities such as metocean, geotechnical and pipeline route surveys.

There are considerable benefits for the offshore petroleum industry and regulators alike associated with building strong environmental foundations. A strong foundation can allow operators to present scientifically sound arguments for the environmental acceptability of their activities. This in turn can lead to more efficient and timely environmental approval processes that deliver high standard outcomes for the environment.

Following the Montara blowout and spill in 2009, there are higher community expectations that industry is well prepared if things do not proceed as planned. Preparedness with respect to baseline environmental data and operational and scientific monitoring has been highlighted as an area for improvement. Completing this work could be viewed as an important step in the processes of building strong environmental foundations by the offshore petroleum industry.

Environmentally-responsible planning and management of operations is an ethic reflected in the environmental



policies of many petroleum operators. Strong environmental foundations may serve broader purposes including demonstrating environmental stewardship to the broader community and in doing so helping to maintain the social licence to operate.

With the above in mind, operators are encouraged to plan for and build environmental foundations well in advance of lodging environmental approval documents and commencing activities that pose risk to the environment.

Activity and performance

As at 15 February 2013

Disclaimer: Data presented here may vary as further information becomes available.

Assessments

SUBMISSIONS		2012		2013
Assessment type	Subtype	Nov	Dec	Jan
ATBA access application	Not applicable	0	0	1
Diving safety management system	New	0	0	0
	Revision	1	0	0
Diving start-up notice	Not applicable	3	1	3
Environment plan	New	8	9	3
	Revision	3	1	0
PSZ application	New	1	0	0
	Renewal	0	0	1
Safety case	New	1	0	3
	Revision	6	6	4
Scope of validation	Not applicable	5	4	2
Well activity application	Not applicable	9	16	11
Well operations management plan	New	1	0	0
	Variation	0	1	0
TOTAL		38	37	28

NOTIFICATION OF DECISIONS		Accepted / agreed / advised			Rejected / refused / not accepted / declined			% Notified within time regulations		
		2012		2013	2012		2013	2012		2013
Assessment type	Subtype	Nov	Dec	Jan	Nov	Dec	Jan	Nov	Dec	Jan
ATBA access application	Not applicable	0	0	1	0	0	0	-	-	100%
Diving safety management system	New	0	0	1	0	0	0	100%	-	100%
	Revision	0	1	0	0	0	0	-	100%	-
Diving start-up notice	Not applicable	2	0	1	0	0	2	100%	-	100%
Environment plan	New	3	3	4	0	0	0	100%	100%	100%
	Revision	1	0	0	0	0	0	100%	100%	100%
PSZ application	New	2	0	0	0	0	0	100%	-	-
	Renewal	1	0	0	0	0	0	100%	-	-
Safety case	New	0	0	2	1	0	0	100%	100%	100%
	Revision	8	3	5	2	0	1	100%	100%	100%
Scope of validation	Not applicable	4	3	4	0	1	0	100%	100%	100%
Well activity application	Not applicable	19	7	15	1	1	0	100%	100%	100%
Well operations management plan	New	1	1	0	0	0	0	100%	100%	-
Title activity application	Not applicable	1	0	0	0	0	0	100%	-	-
TOTAL		42	18	33	4	2	3	100%	100%	100%

Note : In some instances, a single assessment may be submitted for multiple facilities.

ATBA – Area to be avoided

PSZ–Petroleum safety zone

Inspections

TYPE	2012												2013
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Facilities / activities inspected	5	7	11	7	13	19	5	50	5	20	13	5	7

Complaints

TYPE	2012												2013
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
OHS Complaints	1	2	0	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	0
EM Complaints	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Injuries

TYPE	2012												2013
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Lost time injuries (LTI >1 day)*	0	0	1	3	1	2	2	6	2	1	1	1	#
Alternative duties injuries (ADI)	1	2	6	4	2	4	2	1	3	1	7	4	#
Medical treatment injuries (MTI)	4	5	2	1	4	4	2	0	4	4	6	2	#
Total recordable cases (TRC)	5	7	9	8	7	10	6	7	9	6	14	7	#

* LTI incl. lost time injuries less than 3 days

As reported under OPGGS(S) Regulation 2.42. (injury summaries submitted not less than 15 days after the end of each month)

Data not yet available

Enforcements

Eight enforcement actions were taken against five operators in the last three months.

Enforcement action types	2012												2013
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Do not disturb notice	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Improvement notice	4	2	1	2	6	3	0	1	5	23	3	0	0
Intent to withdraw WOMP acceptance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Prohibition notice	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Request for revised SC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Request for revised EP	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Verbal advice/warning	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Withdrawal of acceptance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Written advice/warning	1	1	3	2	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	1
TOTAL	5	5	9	5	7	3	3	3	5	25	5	1	2

SC – Safety case

EP - Environment plan

WOMP - Well operations management plan



Incident notifications

INCIDENT TYPE		2012 2013		
		Nov	Dec	Jan
Accidents and dangerous occurrences	Death or serious injury	0	1	0
	Incapacitation >= 3 days LTI	0	0	0
	Accidents total	0	1	0
	Could have caused death or serious injury	3	2	2
	Could have caused incapacitation >= 3 days LTI	2	1	0
	Fire or explosion	0	2	0
	Collision marine vessel and facility	1	0	0
	Uncontrolled HC release >1 - 300 kg	2	2	1
	Uncontrolled HC release >300 kg	0	0	0
	Uncontrolled PL release >80 - 12 500 L	0	0	0
	Unplanned event - implement emergency response plan	8	7	11
	Damage to safety-critical equipment	9	17	3
	Other kind needing immediate investigation	9	6	8
	Pipeline - kind needing immediate investigation	1	1	0
	Dangerous occurrences total	35	38	25
Accidents and dangerous occurrences total		35	39	25
Reportable environmental incidents	Hydrocarbon / petroleum fluid release	0	0	1
	Chemical release	1	0	0
	Drilling fluid / mud release	0	0	0
	Fauna incident	0	1	0
	Other	0	1	0
EM reportable incidents total		1	2	1
Recordable environmental incidents	Dropped object	2	2	Data not yet available
	Gas Release	1	3	
	Hazardous chemical spill	0	1	
	Oil spill < 80L	6	2	
	PFW- excess oil in water	1	0	
	Water spill	1	0	
	Non- HC Marine pollution	0	1	
	Other	0	3	
EM recordable incidents total		11	12	
Not reportable incidents	OHS Not notifiable	5	1	0
	OHS Exercise	0	1	0
	EM Not notifiable	1	0	0
	EM Exercise	0	2	0
Not reportables total		6	4	0
GRAND TOTAL		53	57	26

As notified under OPGGS(S) Regulation 2.41.

HC – Hydrocarbon

PL - Petroleum liquid

EM – Environmental management




OHS – Occupational health and safety

PFW – Produced formation water



Upcoming events

- 6 March 2013 MarineSafe forum, Perth
- 7 March 2013 DrillSafe forum, Perth
- 8 April 2013 Offshore petroleum forum: spill preparedness and response, Cairns
- 8-12 April 2013 SPILLCON conference, Cairns
- 26-29 May 2013 APPEA annual conference and exhibition, Brisbane



Feedback

NOPSEMA welcomes your comments and suggestions. Please direct media enquiries, requests for publications, and enquiries about NOPSEMA events to communications@nopsema.gov.au. Operators and other employers are encouraged to circulate this newsletter to their workforce. Past issues of this newsletter are available from NOPSEMA's website at nopsema.gov.au.

Subscribe

NOPSEMA has recently expanded its online subscription service. To receive the latest news and developments from Australia's national regulator for the oil and gas industry please complete the online [subscription form](#). NOPSEMA's services include news and information on environmental management news, HSRs, media releases, safety alerts and *the Regulator* newsletter.

Contact details

Perth Office

Level 8
58 Mounts Bay Road Perth
Western Australia

p: +61 (0) 8 6188 8700
f: +61 (0) 8 6188 8737

GPO Box 2568
Perth WA 6001