

Please check the following boxes if applicable to this report			Nil Incident Report: <input type="checkbox"/>	Final report for this activity: <input type="checkbox"/>	
Titleholder name:	Woodside	Titleholder business address:	240 St Georges Terrace Perth WA 6000	Title of environment plan for the activity:	Greater Enfield Tieback Environment Plan
Activity type: (e.g. drilling, seismic, production)	Drilling and Completions Subsea Installation	Month, Year:	June 2018	Facility name and type: (e.g. MODU, Seismic Vessel, FPSO)	DPS-1 – MODU G1201
Contact person:	██████████	Email:	██████████@Woodside.com.au	Phone:	██████████
Incident date	All material facts and circumstances (including release volumes to environment if applicable)	Performance outcome(s) and/or standard(s) breached	Action taken to avoid or mitigate any adverse environmental impacts of the incident	Corrective action taken, or proposed, to stop, control or remedy this incident	Action taken, or proposed, to prevent a similar incident occurring in future
7 th June 2018	The DPS1 drill rig completed drilling the NOL02 17-1/2" riserless hole and cementing the 13-5/8" casing to seabed, on 19th May 2018 without observation of gas bubble weeping. Operational measures of displacing the well to 1.15sg fluid, flow checking the well, and then cementing the 13-5/8" casing to seabed	EPO 15 No subsea loss of containment as a result of encountering a shallow gas hazard	As per corrective action	Complete a Risk assessment and ALARP assessment for planned Drill and Completion operations at NOL02 and subsequent hook up and production of well over field life.	Following the LAV03WI shallow gas release in February, the following changes were actioned and implemented during drilling of NOL02: - Displacement to 1.15sg weighted fluid at section TD of Laverda and Norton over Laverda riserless sections as preventative mitigation. - Analysis of gamma ray/resistivity logging while drilling and annulus pressure while drilling to estimate origin depth and thickness of gas.

	<p>were implemented at NOL02 in accordance with changes actioned from LAV03WI shallow gas release in February.</p> <p>While TMT ROV, after rig was released (located on the Far Seeker vessel) was retrieving the wellhead alignment frame (WHAF) from NOL02, minor gas bubble weeping was observed (7th June 2018). Four weep points were identified by initial observation (14th June 2018):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) 3m from wellhead @ 290°hdg 2) 0.2m from wellhead @ 270°hdg 3) 0.5m from wellhead at 250°hdg 4) From LP housing cement ports, where hydrates are also observed. <p>ROV follow-up inspection on the 7th of July, recorded an</p>				<p>Actions captured in the standing instructions for drillers for all reminding top hole sections.</p> <p>Proposed action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct Risk assessment for remaining riserless hole sections for future NOL01 and NOL03 wells, currently planned for Nov 2018 and Jan 2019 respectively.
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	<p>estimated recorded an estimated total leak rate of 164 ml/minute from three small leak sites (ranging from 10-112.5 ml/min) around the seabed surrounding the well head. 1 x Gas sample was collected during this inspection. Gas composition analysis will be completed.</p> <p>This hazard was identified in well planning phase and managed per the D&C Risk Management Procedure (DC0000AP2547289) and described in section 4.6 of the Ngujima-Yin Well Operations Management Plan (WOMP) Revision 1.</p>				
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APPROVED

<p>27th June 2018</p>	<p>On the 27th of June it was identified that there were intermittent periods where a support vessel wasn't on continuous standby to support the DPS1 in accordance with PS 2.2.</p>	<p>PS 2.2 Activity support vessel on continuous standby (as per requirements of the Safety Case) during drilling activities to assist in third party vessel interactions (including warning to vessels approaching the 500m petroleum safety zone) to prevent unplanned interaction and assist in emergencies as required.</p>	<p>No impacts to the environment.</p>	<p>Reiterated to appropriate personnel responsible, the requirement for a support vessel to be on continuous standby in accordance with PS 2.2.</p>	<p>Proposed action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Continue ongoing monitoring of planned vessel movements. - Regular communication of the PS 2.2 requirement to relevant personnel responsible for managing vessel movements.
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