INTERNAL USE ONLY

Notifiable incident

Notification ID	NTF11650
Duty holder	Woodside Energy Ltd
Facility/Activity	Vincent
Nearest state	WA
Incident	OHS-DSCE - Process control module failure

Basic information provided at time of notification	
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	18/07/2022 02:00 PM (AWST)
Notification date	19/07/2022 10:00 AM (AWST)
NOPSEMA response date	19/07/2022 12:00 PM (AWST)
Received by	[redacted]

Summary of information provided	
Brief descriptive title	OHS-DSCE - Process control module failure
Incident location	Process deck
Subtype/s	Electrical
Summary *(provided at notification)*	During shunt trip testing the PCM (process control module) failed and activated isolations to that part of the process.

Request permission to disturb the site	
Permission given	Not Applicable
Permission given by	
Permission given on	

Initial spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	
Liquid (L)	
Release type	
More information	

Details of person providing information to NOPSEMA	
Full name	[redacted]
Job title	[redacted]

Initial notification category	
Initial category type *(based on notification)*	Dangerous Occurrence
Initial category *(based on notification)*	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Running sheet
There are no running sheet entries for this notification

Decision	
Escalate to level 1	Yes
Inspector	[redacted]
Escalated on	19/07/2022 13:02

Final notification category	
Final category type *(based on final report)*	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category *(based on final report)*	OHS - damage to safety-critical equipment

Immediate causes	
Details	Incorrect configuration of trip circuit

Initial report	
Due date	21/07/2022
Received date	18/07/2022
Reviewed date	21/07/2022
Reviewed by	[redacted]
Additional details provided by duty holder	Brief description of incident During testing as part of the Annual Emergency Shutdown (ESD) event, 64-XS-4055 failed to trip the non-Ex loads in the Vincent Production Control Module container Work or activity being undertaken at time of incident Extensive testing of final element trip testing related to F01 isolation (non-Exloads) What are the Internal Investigation Arrangements: Internal investigation in accordance with Woodside “Health Safety and Environment Event Reporting, Investigating and Learning Procedure" Action taken to make the work-site safe: Action taken: Functionality of 64-XS-4055 restored and operation verified Was an emergency response initiated? No Was anyone killed or injured? No Immediate action taken/intended, if any, to prevent recurrence of incident. Action: Restore functionality to 64-XS-4055 an verify operation Responsible party [redacted] Completion date 18-Jul-2022 Actual or Intended Actual Action: Review any trips initiated by fire and gas detection as shown on the emergency shutdown system overall shutdown hierarchy that require further testing Responsible party [redacted] Completion date 18-Nov-2022 Actual or Intended Intended

Final report	
Due date	17/08/2022
Received date	25/07/2022
Reviewed date	
Reviewed by	
Additional details provided by duty holder	

Final spill and release amounts	
Gas (kg)	0.00
Liquid (L)	0.00
Release type	
More information	

Root causes	
Code	
Description	Has the investigation been completed? Yes Root cause analysis Root Causes Analysis Factor: EQ3-0 Equipment Predictive/Preventative Maintenance Comments: Modules are supplied as standard design all with ESD/F&G relays and this link is either left in place if there is no ESD/F&G trip associated with it, or removed for those with a trip. The link issue has now been rectified. This scope had been executed previously without any failures. The PMRC had recently been updated to reflect an accurate objects list that captured all testing points. This list is now more comprehensive than previous occasions and ensures critical points are captured.

All data received	
Date	22/08/2022