

## OHS Improvement Notice

*Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006, Schedule 3 clauses 78, 78A and 78B*

**Notice No:** 1999

**Date:** 17/04/2025

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To: Eni Australia B.V.

In conducting an OHS investigation in relation to the Blacktip Wellhead Platform facility, I [REDACTED], a NOPSEMA inspector appointed under section 602 of the *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006* (the Act), am satisfied on reasonable grounds that Eni Australia B.V. has contravened a provision of a listed OHS law and is likely to contravene that provision again

AND

As a result, there is, or may be, a risk to the health or safety of a person at the Blacktip Wellhead Platform facility.

The relevant listed OHS law that I am satisfied that has been contravened, and is likely to be contravened again, is Clause 9(1)(b) of Schedule 3 of the Act. This law requires the operator of a facility to take all reasonably practicable steps to ensure that all work and other activities carried out on the facility are carried out in a manner that is safe and without risk to the health of any person at the facility.

The reasons for my opinion are:

1. Failure to Maintain a Safe System of Work (Permit to Work System)

Eni Australia B.V. has failed to take all reasonably practicable steps to maintain systems of work that are safe and without risk to health, specifically through a functional Permit to Work system. As a result, a member of the workforce received a minor electric shock that did not result in any permanent injury; however, it had the potential to be fatal.

Deficiencies identified in the implementation of the Permit to Work system, which resulted in a person receiving an electric shock, include:

a. Operational Control of Permits:

- The Permit to Work did not adequately describe the job or task being undertaken.
- The Permit to Work failed to identify that the task required electrical isolations.
- The Permit to Work did not identify appropriate safety requirements.
- The Permit to Work did not identify appropriate safety precautions.
- The Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) provided lacked detail for the task being performed.
- 'Own Isolations' were used in contravention of section 9.2.1 of the Permit to Work procedure, referenced in the safety case, which restricts 'Own Electrical Isolations' to minor maintenance tasks and requires Permit Coordinator approval for electrical testing.

b. Permit Authority Understanding and Application:

- Inadequate understanding by the Permit Authority of the permit requirements relevant to the scope for which the permit was issued.
- Failure by the Permit Coordinator to identify that the issued Permit to Work was unsuitable and did not address the risks and controls required for the work.
- Failure by the Permit Coordinator to adhere to section 11.1 of the Permit to Work procedure, referenced in the safety case, which mandates the Permit Coordinator to determine the necessary degree of isolation, including formal electrical isolation.

c. Supervisory Oversight:

- Inadequate supervision, including failure by the supervisor to intervene and stop work despite awareness of permit and isolation deficiencies.
- Failure by the supervisor to enforce adherence to Permit to Work procedures.

d. Permit Auditing and Compliance:

- Lack of adequate permit auditing to ensure permit quality and workforce compliance.
- Observed normalisation of deviations from permit requirements, indicating a lack of governance oversight and auditing.

2. History of Permit to Work System Non-Compliance

Eni Australia B.V. has a documented history of Permit to Work system non-compliance, as evidenced by findings from previous OHS inspections:

a. Planned Inspection (PI3601) – 16 January 2023:

- Conclusion #3601-C2-A1: Failure to appropriately implement the Permit to Work system as described in the facility safety case, particularly regarding responsibilities and authorisation.
- Conclusion #3601-C5-A1: Inadequate implementation of the process for managing and controlling temporary equipment, especially electrical equipment in hazardous areas.

b. Planned Inspection (PI3724) – 6 November 2023:

- Conclusion #3724-C2: The Permit to Work system, while implemented, is not functional in reducing risks to as low as reasonably practicable, including:
  - Lack of control over temporary equipment.
  - Job Hazard Analyses failing to adequately identify hazards and implement controls.
  - Insufficient or absent documented work instructions.
  - Undefined and ineffective auditing frequencies and processes.

c. Planned Inspection (PI4864) – 20 February 2025:

- Conclusion 4864-C05: Recurring use of non-Ex rated 250-volt domestic power boards and extension leads in hazardous areas, indicating a persistent failure to address ignition risks and non-compliance with JHA directives.

As a result of this contravention, I am satisfied that there is, or may be, the following risk to the health or safety of any person:

- **Risk of Electrical Injury or Fatality:** Due to inadequate electrical isolation procedures and the failure to properly control electrical hazards, there is a risk of electric shock, electrocution, or other serious electrical injury.
- **Risk of Injury from Uncontrolled Work Activities:** The gap in the implementation of the Permit to Work system, including deficient hazard analysis, inadequate work instructions, and inadequate supervision, creates a risk of injury from uncontrolled work activities.
- **Systemic Risk of Serious Harm:** The recurring failures in the Permit to Work system, demonstrated by repeated non-compliance and ineffective auditing, indicate a systemic risk of serious injury or fatality due to the normalisation of unsafe work practices.

I am satisfied on reasonable grounds that the following action(s) must be taken by the responsible person to reduce or prevent the risk:

1. Conduct a comprehensive review and revision of the Permit to Work system and associated procedures.
2. Provide thorough training to all personnel involved in the Permit to Work process, including Permit Authorities, supervisors, and workers.
3. Implement a robust audit program to ensure ongoing compliance with Permit to Work procedures.
4. Establish clear and enforceable procedures for the control of temporary equipment, particularly electrical equipment in hazardous areas.
5. Ensure Job Hazard Analysis are completed accurately and correctly for the tasks being undertaken.
6. Enforce the use of correct electrical isolation procedures.

You are required to take action to reduce or prevent the risk within 90 days from the date of this notice.

  
**NOPSEMA INSPECTOR**  


17 April 2025

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When the required action(s) has been completed, the Responsible Person is to submit this part of the notice to the following person via:

Post: Level 10, 58 Mounts Bay Road  
Perth WA 6000

Email: [submissions@nopsema.gov.au](mailto:submissions@nopsema.gov.au)

Name:



Position:

**NOPSEMA INSPECTOR**

Contact number:

+61 8 6188 8700

By signing below, I confirm on behalf of Eni Australia B.V. that the specified action described in Improvement Notice No. 1999 has been undertaken within the period specified.

Signed:

Date:

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(to be signed by responsible person only when the notice has been complied with)

## Notes

1. Under clause 78A of Schedule 3 to the Act, a responsible person who fails to ensure that this notice is complied with, to the extent that it relates to any matter over which the responsible person has control:
  - a. commits an offence and may be liable to a penalty of 300 penalty units for the offence; or
  - b. contravenes a civil penalty provision and may be liable to a civil penalty of 400 penalty units.
2. For every day proceeding the initial offence or contravention the notice is not complied with, the responsible person commits an offence or contravention in respect of each day (including a day of a conviction under this clause or any later day) during which the offence or contravention continues.
3. A copy of this notice must be displayed in a prominent place at or near each workplace which work affected by the notice is being performed. It is an offence to tamper with or remove it until the notice has ceased to have effect.
4. The recipient of this notice must ensure that all relevant requirements for giving copies of the notice to certain persons and representatives are complied with in accordance with cl 78b to Schedule 3 to the Act.
5. Under clause 80A of Schedule 3 to the Act, any of the following persons may request the reviewing authority in writing to review the NOPSEMA inspector's decision:
  - the operator of the facility;
  - the titleholder, if the notice is issued to a titleholder;
  - any person to whom an improvement notice has been issued;
  - an employer, if affected by the decision;
  - a relevant health and safety representative; a relevant workforce representative, if requested by a member of the workforce affected by the decision;
  - a person who owns any workplace plant, substance or thing to which the NOPSEMA inspector's decision relates.