Notifiable incident

Incident ID	5400
Duty holder:	Shell Australia Pty Ltd
Facility/Activity:	Prelude FLNG
Facility type:	Floating liquefied natural gas facility

Incident details	
Division	Occupational Health and Safety
Notification type	Incident
Incident date	10/05/2018 07:35 AM (WST)
Notification date	10/05/2018 08:21 AM (WST)
NOPSEMA response date	10/05/2018 08:44 AM (WST)
Received by	[redacted]
Nearest state	WA
Initial category type *(based on notification)*	Other
Initial category *(based on notification)*	Information provided to NOPSEMA
3 Day report received	11/05/2018
Final report received	14/06/2018
All required data received	14/06/2018
Final category type *(based on final report)*	Dangerous Occurrence
Final category *(based on final report)*	Other kind needing immediate investigation
Brief description	OHS-INFO-Berthing Trials- Towline Failure
Location	
Subtype/s	Other
Summary *(at notification)*	Operator advised that during berthing trials with a LNG Carrier (Gallina) a towing line connected to an infield support vessel parted. This resulted in the berthing operation being aborted and the Gallina moved outside the facility safety zone. At the time of the incident, the tanker was on the final approach approx. 50 metres off the facility.

Details *(from final report)*	Operator advised that during berthing trials with a LNG Carrier (Gallina) a towing line connected to an infield support vessel parted. This resulted in the berthing operation being aborted and the Gallina moved outside the facility safety zone. At the time of the incident, the tanker was on the final approach approx. 50 metres off the facility. During Berthing Operations of the LNG Carrier Gallina to Prelude FLNG facility, the Aft towline parted between the Aft ISV (Tug) and the Gallina. The berthing operation was immediately stopped following the parted line. The operation was being performed by an aft and fwd ISV with a third ISV on standby in location. The below timeline is for the Aft ISV. 0550 The Aft ISV connected a towline to the Gallina outside of the Prelude FLNG Safety Zone by attaching its forward towline to the centre lead aft on the Gallina. 0630 The ISV's and Gallina received permission from the Prelude FLNG to enter the Prelude 1500m Safety zone. 0650 The Aft ISV was requested to move to Starboard beam of tanker, and shortened the towline up to 50m. During this time the pilot requested the Aft ISV to come up to quarter power and stop at different stages. 0732 The pilot (TTL) on the Gallina requested the Aft ISV to come up to quarter power, and as the power was brought up, the towline parted. The pilot was immediately notified. 0733 The Aft ISV commenced retrieving the towline. 0734 The towline was pulled on board the Aft ISV. 0735 The ISV turned around and made fast the aft towline, and stood by the Gallina, whilst the pilot immediately moved the Gallina clear to outside the Prelude FLNG Safety Zone under her own engines. 0746 Berthing operations ceased. Due to design of the towline there was no snap back on either vessel. Further, adequate procedures and controls were in place to exclude people from snap back areas and there was no risk to personal at any time.
Immediate cause/s	The towline, which had a stretcher between two sections of dyneema, was cow-hitched together. When the parted section was examined, it was found to not have sufficient protective cover to prevent the abrasive dyneema from cutting through the stretcher, resulting in the failure of the towline.
Root cause/s	HPD - MGMT SYS - Stds, policies, admin controls not used - SPAC comm NI, HPD - QUALITY CONTROL - QC NI - inspection techniques NI
Root cause description	The towline was not assembled as per the OEM supplied drawing for a cow hitch connection. There was no Delta-web chafe protection on the stretcher and pennant eyes. A) Instructions to vessel were not clear e.g. used stretcher with memory used. Inadequate QA/QC checks

Duty inspector recommendation	
Date	03/05/2018
Duty inspector	[redacted]
Recommendation	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Not applicable
Supporting considerations	

Major investigation decision	
Date	10/05/2018
Decision	Do not conduct Major Investigation
Reasoning	Not applicable
Supporting considerations	

Non-major investigation review and recommendation	
Date	10/05/2018
Inspector	[redacted]
Risk gap	Moderate
Type of standard	Established
Initial strategy	Investigate

Recommended follow up strategy	
Recommended strategy	Investigate
Supporting considerations	Root cause of line failure to be determined.

Non-major investigation decision	
Date	10/05/2018
RoN	[redacted]
RoN review result	Agree with recommendation
Strategy decision	Investigate
Supporting considerations	

Associated inspection	
Inspection ID	1797

Runsheet entries		
1	**Event date**	10/05/2018 03:10 PM
	Event	Incident updated to OKNI at request of [redacted].